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PREFACE

Few events in recent American History have elicited as much
emotionalism and controversy as the fall of South Vietnam.

Although

American troops had not fought in the country since 1973, Americans in
the spring of 1975 were acutely sensitive to the rapidly declining
military situation and the plight of thousands of Vietnamese refugees.
In March and April, efforts by President Gerald R. Ford to secure
emergency military aid for the Saigon government created a furor among
politicians and the public.

Polls showed that a majority of Americans

felt further military aid to Saigon would only prolong the suffering of
millions of indifferent Vietnamese who did not care if they lived under
communism.

Following the fall of Saigon on 29 April, the President's

decision to resettle thousands of "high risk" and other Vietnamese
throughout the nation again caused many Americans to react in a way
which the President said did not seem appropriate for a nation of refugees.
Although difficult to discern because of their closeness, historians
cannot overlook nor avoid the events of 1975.

Basically, it can be

generalized that political factors and public opinion played important
roles in the aid, evacuation and refugee issues.

Public opinion greatly

limited the options of the President, State Department, Defense Department
and the Congress in foreign policy making, in evacuation planning, in the
debate over military aid to Saigon and in planning for the refugee
resettlement program.
The writing of this "instant history" encountered numerous
obstacles.

In many cases, primary sources were not available and many

iii
sources that were used obviously were not the most reliable.
With these limitations in mind, this writer hopes to have illustrated
how public opinion to a degree influenced the policy making process
of the American government by placing constraints upon the complex
political system.
Many individuals have helped me in the preparation of this paper.
Foremost are Dr. Robert David Ward, my major professor, who offered
scholarly advice and criticism, and Captain David Firster, an Army
intelligence officer, who offered much needed analysis of the military
situation in South Vietnam.

Dr. Howard C. Thomas, Jr., a State

Department official who served from 1966 to 3975 in South Vietnam,
also provided invaluable insight.

And, Professors Clement Charlton

Mosely and J. Perry Cochran deserve appreciation for serving on my
reading committee and for the criticism they provided.

Edwin Donald Miller
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CHAPTER I
THE VIETNAM DILEMMA

Will some future poet write (of) 'the click heard round the
world?'
That click would be the sound made by some rifle
hammer striking an empty chamber the day that the last round of
ammunition had been spent by those fighting for their freedom
in Southeast Asia.—General George Brown, Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff.^

The rapidly declining military situation in Vietnam and Cambodia
of April 1975 came at a turbulent time in American history.

Faced with

double-digit inflation and an unemployment rate fluctuating between six
and nine percent, Americans for the most part reacted suspiciously, if
not bitterly, to attempts by President Gerald R. Ford to convince the
Congress to appropriate emergency military aid to America's Southeast
Asian friends who were struggling for their survival.

Americans felt

that further military aid from the United States to the two hopelessly
corrupt dictatorships would only prolong the suffering of millions of
indifferent Vietnamese and Cambodians who did not care whether they lived
under communism.

Moreover, the nation appeared war weary--tired of a

10-year war that still had no end in sight, had cost 55,000 American
lives, $150 billion and had led the nation to the worst economic slowdown
since the Great Depression of the 1930s.
Public opinion clearly did not support the President's seemingly
incessant requests for military aid.

A Louis Harris poll conducted in

the last week of March, a week when South Vietnam's President Nguyen
Van Thieu attempted to consolidate his military forces, showed that 68
Newsweek, March 31 , 1975, p. 16.

2

per cent of Americans opposed additional military aid for Cambodia and
even more, 74 per cent, opposed further aid to South Vietnam.

2

On 28 April Time magazine correspondents reporting on the "mood"
of the nation expressed this anti-war sentiment of most Americans.

James

Bell relayed feelings from the South:
This region, where Presidents from Eisenhower through
Nixon received their strongest and most lasting support
for the war in Vietnam, has had it. As far as the South
goes, the long and painful episode ended with the return
of the last American prisoner of war.
So Southerners
generally say no to further military aid for Vietnam or
the involvement of the U.S. Army, Air Force or Navy.
They are, of course, for the evacuation of Americans
but are nervous about the deployment of large numbers of
Vietnamese.^

And, Benjamin W. Gate reported on Midwestern views:

"Even the

President's hometown paper, the Grand Rapids Press, accused Ford of
'perpetuating the frauds (of the past.)'"^
And, from the West, Time's Jess Cook reported similar views:

This side of the Rockies, most people make it clear
that they have heard it all, viewed it all and read
it all before... There is little enthusiasm for giving
even humanitarian aid."*

For the Congress, the decline of Vietnam came during an era
when it was attempting to reassert its power over the Executive branch.
Perhaps rejections of President Ford's requests for emergency military
aid to Saigon signified defiance, rather than moral conviction, to the
Executive who, Congress believed, had used the Vietnam War to usurp
Thid.
Time, April 28, 1975, p. 12.
4
Ibid.
5
Ibid.
3

3

congressional responsibilities.

However, reports concerning the sad

state of affairs in Saigon—the corruption at high levels and the
abandonment of one billion dollars worth of United States supplied
military equipment by fleeing South Vietnamese troops—greatly distressed
the Congress which wanted to end this long national nightmare.

Never¬

theless, in the face of such obvious adverse public and congressional
feelings, both President and State Department appeared to continue to
push Congress for military aid so the Indochina war could be continued.

Debate Over Military Aid
In December 1974 Communist forces consisting of both North
Vietnamese Regular and Provisional Revolutionary Government troops
launched a relative weak, but psychologically effective, offensive in
South Vietnam.

The offensive did not surprise many who felt that

Congress in 1973 had shirked America's responsibilities as guarantor
of the Paris Peace Accord by passing legislation which prohibited the
President from using American military forces to retaliate against
Communist forces that disregarded the Accord.

Now, a year and a half

after enactment of the legislation, North Vietnamese forces were able
to move large numbers of troops into the South and launch an offensive
without worrying about American intervention.

As Communists pushed

southward, Thieu's military advisors made a tragic blunder by over¬
estimating the enemy's strength while underestimating the abilities of
South Vietnamese military forces to stop the insurgents.^

As a result,

^Interview with Dr. Howard S. Thomas, State Department, by
E.D. Miller at Fort Indiantown Gap, Pa., December 20, 1975.
(Hereinafter
cited as Thomas interview.)
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Thieu's advisors on 15 January urged him to abandon the high plateau
area of the country—nearly one half—and to consolidate his disinte¬
grating forces.
Thieu waited until 10 March when Communist forces launched an
unexpected attach on Ban Me Thout in the central highlands before
undertaking the ill-timed and unplanned withdrawal.

The President, in

the face of this first major Communist attack, ordered his forces to
move southward in defense of Saigon and the Mekong Delta which contained
the bulk of South Vietnamese, the economy and rice land.

However, the

hastily executed move caused panic among smaller South Vietnamese
military units whose commanders perceived the withdrawal as a rout
caused by overwhelming Communist forces.''
The climax of the debacle came around 31 March with the fall
of Da Nang.

In an attempt to keep thousands of Vietnamese out of

Communist hands, the United States decided to stage a massive evacuation.
The evacuation, the largest ever planned, called for a massive movement
by air and sea of some 500,000 Vietnamese to Phu Loc and the port
cities of Cam Ranh Bay and Vung Tao.

Thieu planned to use his troops

to hold back Communist advances at the ancient imperial capital of Hue
while South Vietnamese and Americans undertook the difficult evacuation.
The premature withdrawal of the Army's elite airborne division
and marine units from the Hue area caused confusion and troop morale to
sag.

O

Instead of withdrawing his disorganized units first, Thieu

decided to leave them in contact and instead pull back his best forces

^ Jacksonville Journal, May 3, 1975.
® Thomas interview.
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to protect Saigon and himself from possible coups.

In hopes of rallying

his troops, Thieu told them that the battle would be the most decisive
in Vietnamese history.

His troops felt differently.

Within hours after

the evacuation began, Thieu's troops began to abandon their weapons and
defensive positions.

The evacuation turned into a tactical nightmare

as mobs of troops and civilians descended upon the evacuation planes
and ships.
The resulting confusion allowed amazed North Vietnamese leaders
to move all but two or three of their divisions—numbering about 20—
from the north into the void created by the disintegrating Army of South
Vietnam.^

As Thieu's units continued to needlessly and prematurely

crumble, often without Communist pressure, the South Vietnamese president
was unable to stabilize the declining military situation because he failed
to tell his generals explicitly what his strategy involved.
Thieu to the field changed by the hour.

Orders from

First he told his commanders

to withdraw; then to defend in position; then to attack the Communist
forces.
President Ford, in the wake of these setbacks, proposed to
Congress an amergency military aid bill consisting of $722 million,
hoping that Saigon, with additional military aid, could stop Communist
advances.

During the week of 23 March, and despite an intensified

Easter offensive launched by the Communists, Congress ignored the
President's plan to resupply Thieu's forces and instead passed a $3.7

9

Ibid.

10

Ibid.

6

billion foreign aid bill that reduced Ford's request for aid to
Indochina by $449.8 million.

Both houses then adjourned for two weeks

without voting on the emergency aid.
With Da Nang lost, the President warned the Congress during a
joint session on 14 April that the United States could not abandon its
friends while American adversaries supported and encouraged theirs.
He further said:

The chances for an enduring peace after the last American
fighting man left Vietnam in 1973 rested on two publicly
stated premises: First, that if necessary, the United
States would help sustain the terms of the Paris Accord
it signed two years ago; and the second, that the United
States would provide adequate economic and military
assistance to South Vietnam.H

The President explained that North Vietnam had violated the Paris
Accord by introducing more than 350,000 troops, virtually its entire
army, into

the South while the United States reduced economic and

military aid to South Vietnam.

Ford considered this the coup de grace

because, with this move, the United States had signalled its increasing
reluctance to give any support to South Vietnam which was struggling
for its survival.
The President again urged Congress to grant his $722-million
request for emergency military assistance and additional humanitarian
aid to help ease the suffering of the people of Vietnam.

He also

-^Congressional Record, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. , H2683.
In 1974,
the Congress cut the Administration's aid request to Saigon from $1.4
billion to $700 million.

7

called for Hanoi to honor the 1973 Paris agreement and asked the
signatories, including China and the U.S.S.R., to use their influence
with North Vietnam to bring about a halt to the fighting.
however, ignored the President's plea.

The Congress,

Ford probably knew the Congress

would refuse to grant his emergency military aid request.

In January,

he had first requested $300 million in emergency military aid for
South Vietnam and the Congress refused.

Faced with the refusal, Ford

and his aides argued before congressional committees and in speeches
that South Vietnam needed the aid to "stabilize" the military situation
long enough to permit a negotiated peace and allow for the safe
evacuation of Americans.

Ford told newsmen attending a meeting of the

American Society of Newspaper Editors on 17 April, "I am absolutely
convinced if Congress made available $722 million in military assistance
in a few days the South Vietnamese could stabilize the military situation
in South Vietnam today."

1?

Faced with consistent congressional refusals in March and early
April, the President realized he had no funds for emergency military
aid except a $200-million contingency fund proposed by the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee.

The panel told Ford he could use half of

the amount for humanitarian aid to Cambodia and South Vietnam and the
other half for evacuating Americans from South Vietnam.

Meanwhile,

the House International Relations Committee proposed a similar $327million fund.

i9

The proposals irritated the President who aides said

Jacksonville Journal, April 17, 1975.

8

claimed that no funds would be better than the trifling amount authorized
by the committees. 1 J1
The Congress during the two months of debate over the aid proposals
firmly stood its ground.

Representative Thomas J. Downey, New York,

exemplified the anti-war sentiment which prevailed in the Congress.
Testifying before the House Defense Subcommittee on Appropriations which
was considering the President's request, he asked:
we still there?

"My God.

Why are

Why are we still financing the almost inconceivable

suffering that the people of Vietnam have endured?"

Continuing, he told

the subcommittee:

Almost a third of the Vietnamese population are refugees.
In the years of fighting 860,000 'enemy,' 165,000 ARVN
and 300,000 civilians (have been) killed. Proportionately
it is as though 20 million Americans died in the war
instead of 55,000.-'-^

In the Senate, Mark Hatfield, Oregon, also exemplified the
anti-aid sentiment.

He told his colleagues on 10 April:

The ugly agony of Indochina is made all the more
torturous by the delusive refusal of this nation to
accept the culpability for decades of a morally inde¬
fensible policy whose final failure is now being revealed.^

Later the same day, Representative Robert L. Leggett, California,
echoed the Senate reaction.

Speaking to his colleagues, he branded

Ford's request for additional military aid to Saigon as "absurd" and

Florida Times-Union, April 16, 1975.
-^Congressional Record, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. , E1432.
-^Congressional Record, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., S5637.
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said that in the past year the United States had given Saigon two and
one-half times as much aid as North Vietnam had received from the Soviet
Union and China combined.

Citing Pentagon figures, he said American

military aid to South Vietnam during fiscal year 1975 totalled $1 billion.
Further citing his objections to Ford's proposal, he said; "We have been
engaged in a program of military aid to North Vietnam, giving them free
major pieces of military equipment that have never been fired and only
dropped once."^
Even Republicans in the Congress, although generally not agitating
against Ford, conspicuously avoided comment on the President's request
for emergency aid.

General William C. Westmoreland, commander of

American forces in Vietnam from 1965 through 1968, emerged as one of
the few politicians to voice disgust with the Congress.

He told an

interviewer from the New York Times:

For
the
the
why

the life of me, I can't understand why the people of
United States are not incensed about Congress and
mockery Hanoi has made of the Paris Peace Accord,
we Americans don't see our moral obligation.

By 21 April, poor strategic planning and leadership in Saigon,
combined with the refusal of the United States Congress to grant
emergency military aid, had caused the situation in South Vietnam to
reach the crisis stage.

The resignation of Thieu that day signified

that the end would come shortly.

^Congressional Record, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., S5637.
"^New York Times, March 28, 1975.

10

As Communist troops moved near Saigon in preparation for massive
attacks on the capital city, the American Congress sat back and silently
awaited the fall of South Vietnam.
a political "hot potato."

The issue by now had developed into

The Congress wanted to avoid the issue as

much as the President intended to force the decision on aid upon the
Congress.

Despite token rhetoric concerning the consequences of a fall

of South Vietnam, it appeared that President Ford was more interested
in making sure that Democrats in the election of 1976 would not blame
him for losing Southeast Asia.

At the same time. Congress avoided the

moral side of the Vietnam issue by refusing to realize the critical
role that the United States had in the enforcement of the Paris Accord.
Sensing the anti-war sentiment, however. Congress had nullified the
Nixon Doctrine and unilaterally changed America's foreign policy toward
Asia.

The tragic part was that the Congress, in hopes of avoiding the

political issue, failed to allow the political process to work because
it refused to allow a vote on the President's request.

Congress never

voted on Ford's request for $722 million in emergency military aid and
the President acquiesed to the will of the people.

Politically, the

issue evolved into an acceptable stalemate with neither Congress nor the
President held to blame for the fall of Indochina.

Planning for Evacuation
With the aid controversy raging in Congress, the State Department
reluctantly and half-heartedly began making plans for withdrawal of
Americans and "high risk" Vietnamese.

The first indication the Department

planned to evacuate refugees came no earlier than late March.

Although the

11

military situation did not appear hopeless, the Department discreetly
ordered its embassy in Saigon to start providing weekly status reports
regarding the total numbers and welfare of Americans and others for
whom the United States had emergency evacuation responsibility. 18

The

"others" which the order did not clearly explain included a broad
category of Vietnamese which the State Department fe]t it had a moral
obligation to evacuate because of possible reprisals by a new
Communist regime.

For example, these refugees included close friends of

American citizens, Vietnamese employees of the United States government
and their families, ranking Government of South Vietnam officials and
their families.

1Q

To the Saigon Embassy, the State Department order

also appeared ambiguous because it lacked the necessary criteria for
explaining how many "others" the embassy could designate for evacuation.
Besides, Ambassador Graham Martin felt there was no reason to evacuate
Americans, let alone Vietnamese, because he believed that the American
government would change its mind on the aid issue if the situation
reached the critical point.

20

While Thieu's decision to surrender the northern half of his
country to Communists left hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese homeless,
the resulting panic in Washington left Martin in rage.

The State Depart¬

ment ordered Martin to discreetly suggest to non-official Americans that

l^The President's Advisory Committee on Refugees, "Background
Papers," May 19, 1975.
(Hereinafter cited as Advisory Committee,
Papers.)
^Ibid.
^^Thomas interview.

12

they consider sending out their dependents and to designate "high risk"
Vietnamese for evacuation.Martin refused, arguing that such a move
could prematurely cause the Saigon government to collapse.
Meanwhile in Washington, less than two weeks after the Da Nang
debacle, the President for the first time publicly indicated that he
might authorize the evacuation of Vietnamese refugees.

Ford, in his

State of the World Address on 10 April, told the Congress:

1 must, of course, as I think each of you would, consider
the safety of nearly 6,000 Americans who remain in South
Vietnam and the tens of thousands of South Vietnamese
employees of the United States Government, of news
agencies, of contractors and businesses for many years
whose lives, with their dependents are in very grave
peril. There are tens of thousands of other South
Vietnamese intellectuals, professors, teachers, editors
and opinion-leaders who have supported the South Viet¬
namese cause and the alliance with the United States,
to whom we have a profound moral obligation. 22

In prefacing his remarks about refugees, the President asked
Congress to make a decision on aid by 19 April and revise laws to cover
evacuation of "those Vietnamese to whom we have a very special obligation
and whose lives may be in danger, should the worst come to pass."

9^

In Saigon, a demoralized Thieu considered the speech important because
of what it did not offer:

Ford would not unilaterally provide military

equipment, let alone American troops, to prevent a Communist takeover
in South Vietnam.

O1

Advisory Committee, Papers.
^Congressional Record, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., S5933.
23
Ibid.

13

The following day Cambodia fell to Communists without a tear or
eulogy from either the Congress or the President.

The lack of emotion

gave a preview of the presidential indifference which would greet the
fall of Saigon two weeks later.

Ford conspicuously failed to mention

even the prospect of a fall in his State of the World Address the night
before.

Instead, he waited until 12 April to inform the Congress.

Ford explained in a letter:

On Friday, 11 April 1975, the Khmer Communist forces
had ruptured the Government of the Khmer Republic (GKR)
defensive lines to the north, northwest, and east of
Phnom Pehn and were within mortar range of Pochentong
Airfield and the outskirt of Phnom Penh.
In view of
the deteriorating military situation, and on the
recommendation of the American Ambassador there, I
ordered U.S. military forces to proceed with the
planned evacuation...^

Ford explained that the first elements of the United States
forces entered Cambodian airspace at 8:34 p.m.

(EDT) on 12 April.

This emotionless response, together with refusals by both Ford and the
Congress to use American troops to stop the Communists, signified that
the President was willing to accept the congressional decision to
alter United States foreign policy toward Southeast Asia and to give
up America's quasi-sphere of influence there.
Two days later, 14 April, the State Department began to hasten
evacuation plans and conveyed to its embassy in Saigon a limited parole
authority for "high risk" Vietnamese which the State Department obtained

^Congressional Record, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., S5934.

14

from the Attorney General at the urging of the President.

The

authority allowed the admittance into the United States of about
70,000 Vietnamese who had relatives, either aliens or citizens, living
4-1,
there. 25
As late as 15 April, almost a week following the fall of
Cambodia, the military situation around Saigon appeared so delicate
that presidential aides told newsmen Ford and the Secretary of State
felt that the Saigon government would see any effort to withdraw
Americans as the final American abandoment of the Saigon government.
Both reportedly feared such an act would also provoke hostile action
by South Vietnamese troops or citizens against Americans still in
South Vietnam.

At the same time, Ford may have felt to ask for any¬

thing less than $722 million in emergency aid, although realizing that
his request was futile, would have signalled his willingness to abandon
Saigon and would have hastened the fall of Saigon.
Meanwhile, the news media learned of plans to evacuate refugees
by force if necessary.

Newsweek reported that the President had

approved a plan, code named Operation Talon Vise, to withdraw up to
200,000 South Vietnamese who had been associated with the American
effort in Vietnam.

This number included a select group of political

figures, military men and civil servants whose lives would plainly be
threatened if the Communists took power.

The plan called for the use

of helicopters to pick up evacuees from outlying areas, including a

^Advisory Committee, Papers.
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small number of Vietnamese who had worked for the Central Intelligence
Agency's Phoenix Program, which had liquidated thousands of Vietnamese
who had worked for the Viet Cong.

The plan called for the evacuees to

fly out of Tan Son Nhut airport, located near Saigon, or sail by ship
from the port city of Vung Tau, 40 miles southeast of Saigon.

The plan

frightened the Pentagon, Newsweek reported, because it feared such a
plan would create a logistical nightmare and that it would take at least
six divisions of American troops to secure the airport, and deal with
panicky crowds.

Also, the Pentagon feared the possibility that American

troops would have to fight their way in and out of the nation against
Viet Cong, North Vietnamese Army troops and perhaps vengeful South
Vietnamese.
On 17 April, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, attempting to
calm emerging anti-refugee sentiment, "clarified" the President's State
of the World Address statement which hinted the United States would
accept refugees from South Vietnam.

Before a meeting of the American

Society of Newspaper Editors in Washington, Kissinger said:

If the worst should come to pass and if it were not
possible to stabilize the situation, we feel we have
a moral obligation to help in the evacuation of those
whose association with us now endangers their lives.^

0A

Newsweek, April 21, 1975.
2/Senate Subcommittee on Refugees and Evacuees, "Report on
President Ford's Refugee Resettlement Program," June 19, 1975.
(Hereinafter cited as Kennedy subcommittee.)
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By this time the President realized the worst had already come to
pass and that Congress would not appropriate funds for emergency aid.
At the same time Ford foresaw the development of another sticky political
situation—the refugee problem.

The following day, 18 April, Ford

announced the creation of a special Inter-Agency Task Force consisting
of 12 governmental agencies which would coordinate the evacuation of
Americans, Vietnamese and third-country nationals.

Ford also charged

the Task Force with handling refugee and resettlement problems.
To coordinate activities within the Task Force, Ford appointed
Ambassador L. Dean Brown as his special representative.

Brown, formerly

ambassador to Senegal, The Gambia and Jordan, quickly assembled a small
staff of officers from various governmental agencies and began planning
for the evacuation, staging areas in the Western Pacific, and reception
centers in the United States.^
In Saigon, Ambassador Martin did not appear as pessimistic as
Washington officials.

He continued to believe as late as 21 April that

Thieu, with military aid from the United States, could save South
Vietnam and that a premature evacuation of Americans and Vietnamese
could tip the balance against Saigon.

Therefore, he vetoed proposals

to start moving Vietnamese embassy employees quietly from Saigon.

•^Inter-Agency Task Force on Indochina Refugees, "Report to
Congress," June 15, 1975. The 12 agencies included Departments of:
State; Health, Education and Welfare; Treasury; Defense; Justice;
Interior; Labor; Housing and Urban Development; Transportation; Agency
for International Development; Office of Management and Budget;
Central Intelligence Agency.
2
9Ibid.
30]S[ewsweek, April 21, 1975.
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Congress and Evacuation
As the military situation reached the critical point on 24 April,
congressional disgust with the military aid controversy seeped into
State Department efforts to evacuate Americans and Vietnamese from South
Vietnam.

Only five days before the surrender of Saigon, Representative

John L. Burton of Colorado reported to the House there had been a
decline in the evacuation of Americans.

Burton told the House that on

21 April the State Department evacuated only 574 Americans and 369
dependents and far less on 22 April—only 354 Americans and 225
dependents.

The slow evacuation left in danger some 2,243 officials

and their dependents. Burton said.

He also told his colleagues that he

feared a fall of South Vietnam would give Ford the excuse to intervene
with American troops to evacuate Americans who were stranded in the
■31country. JJ
In the Senate, Dick Clark of Iowa echoed Burton's disgust with
the State Department evacuation efforts.

He told the Senate on 28 April:

In spite of the increasingly dangerous situation, the
number of Americans being brought out has slowed to
something less than a trickle. The net reduction is
65 American citizens. In the meantime, more than
6,600 South Vietnamese were evacuated in the same
period.32

•^Congressional Record, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., E2022. Burton
failed to mention that many Americans resisted leaving the country
until the last minute.
32
Ibid> S6882. One major obstacle, however, was the fact that
the Saigon government was extremely reluctant to grant exit visas.
The 6,600 figure included orphans and Vietnamese dependents of
Americans.

18

Clark said that during the 48-hour period the State Department
had reduced the number of Americans remaining in South Vietnam by only
141, leaving 950 still here.

At the present rate, he said, evacuation

would take two weeks to complete.
The same day, one day before Saigon fell, Speaker of the House
Carl Albert read a letter from President Ford which notified him that
Ford intended to authorize the use of Indochina Postwar Reconstruction
funds to finance the evacuation from South Vietnam of certain South
Vietnamese and nationals from other foreign countries.
Seeing the approaching end, Ford made one last feeble attempt to
secure additional emergency aid.

In addition, the President said he

did not believe the $70 million authorized by Congress for resettling
70,000 refugees would sufficiently cover costs for evacuation and re¬
settlement of possibly 140,000 South Vietnamese.

Stressing the need

for additional funds, he warned the House:

The failure to evacuate these people from South
Vietnam would leave them in danger of harm, perhaps
even death in the face of Communist aggression, and
would cause serious question in the eyes of other
nations regarding the U.S. government's humanitarian
conscience toward those with whom it has been closely
associated and allied with for many years.^

At the Pentagon, officials believed the State Department had
dodged the evacuation issue too long.

In the next to the last week

~^Ibid, H3348.
Ford's letter was dated April 25, 1975. He
based his authority on section 652 of the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961.
-^Ibid.
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in April, Defense Secretary James R. Schlesinger had dispatched 44
American naval vessels, 6,000 Marines, 120 Air Force combat and tanker
planes and 150 Navy planes in anticipation of the final evacuation.
Nevertheless, Ambassador Martin in Saigon continued to argue that the
final withdrawal of Americans from Saigon would trigger panic in Saigon
and hasten the fall of the Government of South Vietnam.^
As Communist forces approached within artillery range of Saigon,
the State Department finally, but tragically too late, defined several
categories of Vietnamese targeted for evacuation.

On 28 April Wash¬

ington authorized the embassy to evacuate
1. up to 4,000 orphans.
2. 1,000 to 75,000 relatives of American citizens or permanent
resident aliens.
3. 50,000 "high risk" Vietnamese, including past and present
American government employees; officials whose cooperation
was necessary for the evacuation of American citizens;
individuals with knowledge of sensitive government
intelligence operations; vulnerable political or intellectual
figures; Communist defectors; employees of U.S. firms
operating in Vietnam; employees of voluntary agencies;
certain labor officials; and participants of U.S. govern¬
ment sponsored programs.
With a final massive evacuation planned. Congress reacted to the
President's plan for bringing thousands of refugees into the United States.
Despite an obvious moral obligation to evacuate thousands of "high risk"

■3 c;

Thomas interview.
-^Kennedy Subcommittee.
It is doubtful whether earlier planning
by the State Department would have allowed a large number of Vietnamese
to leave. The Government of South Vietnam, until shortly before the
collapse, insisted on the normally long and costly procedure for exit
visas.
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Vietnamese who had worked for the United States Government at one time,
there ensued a heated debate.

Numerous politicians feared unemployed

refugees would only add to the nation's failing economy and social
problems while others noted that the French still had problems with the
27,000 Vietnamese refugees they evacuated after their defeat at Dienbienphu
in the 1950s.

Twenty years later about 500 Vietnamese still lived in

a temporary camp about 80 miles from Bordeaux.^
Robert C. Byrd of West Virginia, reflecting the mood of the
Senate, said he had "serious reservations" about the President's plan.

OQ

In a speech on 28 April he told his colleagues:

The United States currently has a jobless rate of 8.7
per cent, the highest since 1941, and our overall
economic picture—the recession, inflation, national
debt, gross national product—is far from bright.
Adding well over 100,000 South Vietnamese to that
picture will not help the United States.

The Senator asked:

Where would the evacuation line be drawn?

Should the government evacuate all Vietnamese who worked for or with
Americans in South Vietnam?

Should the United States evacuate all who

had a connection with the South Vietnamese government?
evacuate only high-ranking officers of the armed forces?

Or should it
Or should

the United States seek to provide asylum for all who fought against the
Communists?

He added:

■^New York Times, April 29, 1975
^Congressional Record, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., S6882.
-^Ibid.
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If large numbers are endangered, then other countries
as well as our own should open their gates to them,
especially those countries that have cultural
similarities to Vietnam. The State Department—to
say nothing of the United Nations—ought to be moving
in that direction.^

In the Senate, on the other side of the controversy, Senator
Hugh Scott of Pennsylvania emerged as the President's defender and
primary backer concerning evacuation planning and the resettlement
effort.

Scott told his colleagues on 28 April:

I would like these people coming to the United States
to feel that we want them, that we welcome them, that
we are glad they were able to escape to freedom. But
I do not want to be part of any of this niggling or
nitpicking about 'Don't send them to my state.'
I
would be glad to see them come to Pennsylvania and
to be a part of our life, and we will welcome them.^-'-

Scott told the Senate that America had always opened its heart—
to the Hungarians, to the Cubans, to refugees from Bangladesh, Nigeria,
India and "to all parts of the world that had seen suffering, to dis¬
placed and oppressed people.Chastising those who voiced displeasure
with Ford's plan to bring such a large number of refugees to the United
States, he said:

"I am not going to ask others to do what I am not

willing to do myself.

I think it is sufficient to mention this simply

because I do not want to be in a position of a politician telling other
/^
people what to do."4J

40Ibid.
41Ibid.
ibid.
43
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Scott s offer, perhaps to his dismay, became an offer too good
for the Pentagon to refuse.

Following the opening of the three

refugee camps in Arkansas, California and Florida, the Pentagon would
grasp hold of Scott's "Open Heart" rhetoric and announce the decision
that a camp would open in Pennsylvania.

CHAPTER II
PLANNING FOR REFUGEES

We were aware very early... the government as a matter
of policy was going to evacuate, or try to evacuate,
some people...we were getting figures at that time up
to a million and a half—Anthony Auletta, Department
of the Army planner.!

In April, as Communist forces captured provinces north of Saigon
and the President and Congress squabbled over the military aid issue,
the Department of Defense alerted the Army that it would have total
responsibility for caring for as many as 1.5 million refugees should
South Vietnam collapse.^

Faced with the possibility of such a logistical

nightmare and armed with scant information from the State Department
concerning the scope of the refugee situation, the Army's upper echelons
reacted and set about making contingency plans to prepare dozens of Army
posts across the nation as possible refugee camps.

To say the least,

the Army appeared hesitant about involvement in a refugee program.
With fewer than 800,000 in its peacetime force, military planners
realized that the Army could neither adequately continue its worldwide
security missions nor maintain its readiness if it had to run such a
large disruptive non-military mission.

Historically, the Army had good

reason for its reluctance about such operations.

From the Civil War

^Interview with Anthony Auletta, Office of Deputy Chief of Staff
for Operations, Department of the Army, by E.D. Miller at Washington,
D.C., July 24, 1975.
(Hereinafter cited as Auletta, interview.)
Ibid.
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forward, the Army became bogged down with a series of disaster relief
operations resulting from floods, tornadoes, hurricans and earthquakes.
Governors in many of these cases protested the interference, or inter¬
vention, of federal troops and Congress many times refused, or simply
failed, to reimburse the Army for supplies it had expended during
relief operations.

In addition, such tasks invariably interrupted vital

military training and affected preparedness.

Nevertheless, despite these

traditional reservations, the Army began to realize in the last weeks
of April that the failing military situation in South Vietnam would
again force it to become involved in a tremendous humanitarian under¬
taking but another disruptive non-military duty.

Initial Studies
As in the past. Army planners and leaders reacted pragmatically
about participating in such a venture.

Although most had a great amount

of compassion for the refugees because they had fought in South Vietnam,
they quickly realized that involvement in a long-term resettlement
program would, as in the past, drain combat units of their manpower and
perhaps create morale problems among troops.

Many also felt civilians

in non-military government agencies should take responsibility for any
type of program which dealt with refugees.

As a result of these fears

and apprehensions. Army planners at the Pentagon considered requesting
mobilization of Reserve units of selected reservists to help ease the
burden.

■3

3
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As the evacuation from Saigon reached its peak on 28 April, Major
General Charles R. Sniffin, Director of Operations at Department of the
Army, sent Army Secretary Howard "Bo" Galloway a feasibility study con¬
cerning the use of Reserve civil affairs units to help supply, feed and
clothe an unknown number of refugees.^

Sniffin outlined three possible

ways that the Army could use the Pveserves to help staff and run refugee
camps if the task proved too large for the Active Army to handle.
first discussed the manpower problem.

He

Selective mobilization of Army

Reserve civil affairs units, Sniffin said, would solve this problem.
Either the Congress or the President could approve mobilization under
Sections 672 or 673 of Title 10, U.S. Code.

Sniffin told the Secretary

this course of action would provide the Army with the necessary manpower,
but one important disadvantage "would be possible political repercussions
accompanying selective mobilization for a Vietnamese related purpose."^
A second course of action Sniffin considered included using Reserve
units during their annual training, usually a period of 12-14 days of
summer training.

This option was not only unfeasible but totally

impractical since many unit personnel had unnecessary specialties such
as finance and archives protection, the general said.

The third option,

which the Army ultimately would choose, somewhat because of political

^Information Paper, Subject: Feasibility of Using Reserve Civil
Affairs Units in Refugee Aid Program; from Maj. Gen, Charles R. Sniffin,
Director of Operations, Department of the Army, through Chief of Staff,
U.S. Army, to Secretary of the Army, April 28, 1975.
^Ibid.
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pressure to get reservists involved, included using selected reservists
who would volunteer for tours of duty of 90 to 125 days to augment
Active Army forces.

This option appeared to be the best. Sniffin told

Galloway.
Sniffin's rationale for supporting the third option—if the
State Department evacuated 1.5 million Vietnamese—proved realistic.
In view of the heated debate over military aid to South Vietnam going
on in the Congress, Sniffin realized that the Congress would never
authorize mobilization of Reserves for a Vietnamese related action,
unless the task of supporting refugees was too large for the Active Army.
Meanwhile, meager coordination between the Departments of Defense
and State in the weeks prior to the fall of Saigon, apparently caused
by outward antagonism between Secretaries Kissinger and Schlesinger,
appeared to compound the Army's planning problems.

Although the State

Department appeared to hasten plans for evacuation of Americans through¬
out April, the Defense Department lacked adequate information and a
realistic estimate of the number of Vietnamese refugees State officials
wanted to evacuate.

By the time the State Department did advise the

Pentagon of its plans to evacuate only 50,000 refugees—rather than
1.5 million—it was already 22 April and the military situation around
Saigon had reached the point that it appeared Saigon would fall any
day. ^

^Message.
From Secretary of State to Saigon Embassy, Subject:
Indochina Evacuees, April 22, 1975.
Schlesinger was critical of the
lag in evacuation planning. He believed that the State Department
should have evacuated Americans and Vietnamese in March and early
April before the situation reached the crisis stage.
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Defense Department planners, somewhat deceived by this belated
revelation, tentatively believed that such a small number of refugees
would create few problems, and hence failed to adequately inform the
three subordinate military services of the potential gravity of the
refugee situation.

Compounding the communications problem between the

Defense Department and its services appeared to be the preparation of
contingency plans for the intervention of American troops into South
Vietnam to either stabilize the military situation or provide the large
security force needed to secure harbors and airports for a massive
evacuation, if the President authorized such moves.

Pentagon planners

engaged in making such plans therefore had little time to worry about
plans for refugees camps.

That was a bridge which could be crossed at

a later time, if needed.
It was not until 22 April, one week before the fall of Saigon,
that the Defense Department had enough information about State Depart¬
ment evacuation plans that it was able to determine that it would be¬
come involved in a refugee resettlement program.

Only then did information

trickle down from the Pentagon's upper echelons to the Army so it could
issue guidance to its planning sections so they could cfeal with the
developing refugee situation.

7

Upon issuance of the Defense Department directive which recognized
the crisis, the Department of the Army told its planning sections and

7

Ibid.
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the United States Army Forces Command in Atlanta, Georgia, about plans
by State Department officials in Saigon to move up to 50,000 designated
evacuees to safe havens either outside the continental United States or
to installations within United States territories.^
With this initial guidance, it appeared to the Army that the
State Department had drastically changed its plans to bring up to 1.5
million refugees into the United States and that the Department planned
to open camps for only a small number of refugees outside the continental
United States.

Therefore, Army planners rationalized there was no

immediate need to request mobilization of the Reserves or to assign a
large number of Active Army units to run refugee camps.

Of course, the

Army realized it would participate in the program to a degree, perhaps
by providing a handful of advisory personnel who had specialties in camp
operations.

However, to the Army the important point was that the State

Department would locate the camps outside the United States and take
responsibility for the operation.
The following day, 23 April, a telephone call from General Sniffin
to Brigadier General William R. Todd, Deputy of Operations and Plans
at FORSCOM, reinforced this assumption.

Sniffin told Todd he had

discussed the evacuation with a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who

O

Ibid.
FORSCOM was directly responsible for the Army's efforts
in Operation New Arrivals, the code name for the resettlement program.
FORSCOM fell directly beneath the Department of the Army in the chain
of command and had command authority over all Active Army, National
Guard and Army Reserve forces within the continental U.S., Hawaii and
Panama.
FORSCOM replaced the old Continental Army Command in a re¬
organization in 1972.
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had told him there would be no refugee camps opened in the United States.
Todd recorded the information in a memorandum:

To the extent possible, we will be using a major staging
area on Guam to handle up to 50,000 evacuees either in
buildings or tents. They (the State Department) hope
to bring, at least initially, to CONUS (Continental United
States) only those who have some form of sponsorship in
the United States. After medically checked and screened,
they would be moved to the United States, hopefully, right
to destinations. No major staging facility (would be
needed) in CONUS.9

Todd added, however, that Sniffin personally considered this
the "ideal case" and that Lieutenant General Donald H. Cowles, in charge
of personnel operations at Department of the Army, wanted FORSCOM to
prepare possible plans for handling a minimum of 20,000 refugees.
In anticipation of a last-minute order to open stateside refugee
centers, FORSCOM went ahead and started preparing surveys on the capa¬
bilities of inactive camps around the nation to handle refugees.

As a

result, FORSCOM earmarked three sites which it felt could adequately
house and support refugees.

FORSCOM believed Camp Roberts, California,

followed by Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, and Camp Pickett, Virginia—all
inactive World War II camps—were the three best camps it could provide.
In making its selections of sites, FORSCOM followed orders from Depart¬
ment of the Army to keep the camps located on the west coast and in
the South because a warm climate would be best for Vietnamese.^

9

Notes from telephone call. From Maj. Gen. Sniffin to Brig.
Gen. Todd; 1200 hours, April 23, 1975.
10
Ibid.
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During the telephone conversation between Sniffin and Todd, the
question of utilization of Reserves came up again and Sniffin queried
Todd about the impact refugee camps would have on summer training.

Sniffin

also warned Todd of a possible requirement of providing Active or Reserve
Component support to Guam and to "also think about the possibility of
using reservists to help run the camps.Todd summarized the con¬
versation :

J4 hopes that we will not have to establish this major
facility in CONUS, but we feel, as prudent planners,
(it would be best) to organize. Dollars for this
would be provided.
Strictly contingency planning at
this point. With the 50,000 (at Guam) that will be
handled, there are 1,000 Cambodians.
It is hoped
that any number over the 50,000 in Guam could be
handled through the U.N. Refugee Control Apparatus,
but there is little international interest in getting
involved in this thing. That is one of the reasons
they are using Guam.
It keeps it OCONUS (outside of
the Continental United States) and thus makes it more
international than if they were brought into CONUS.^

At 3:00 p.m. the same day the magnitude of the refugee situation
began to unfold.

The military situation around Saigon had reached the

crisis stage and Thieu had resigned as president.

Communists now were

demanding that Thieu's successor, Tran Van Huong, resign from office so
that a more receptive president could be appointed to surrender the
government.

It appeared that Saigon could fall at any minute and that

the Defense Department might need to take extraordinary measures and send

^Ibid.
1
Ibid.
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troops into Saigon to evacuate Americans and Vietnamese.

Sniffin again

telephonedFORSCOM and said his office was about to prepare a message which
would provide FORSCOM with planning guidance concerning the refugee
situation.

Sniffin also said the State Department that day had firmly

designated Guam as a safe haven capable of housing only 25,000 evacuees,
instead of 50,000.

In the meantime, 6,000 refugees had arrived at

Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines and an additional 25,000 were
on their way from Saigon to the Islands.

In addition, demands by the

Philippine Government to the State Department to move the 6,000 refugees
out of the Islands immediately added to the mounting evacuation con¬
fusion.

As a result, the Department re-routed all evacuation flights

leaving Saigon to an already crowded Guam.^-^
At this point, the Army believed the only major problem it had
to deal with concerned logistical support for the Guam operation.

Depart¬

ment of the Army again told FORSCOM that it would need to provide only
"housekeeping" troops, such as medical support and engineers to help
organize and construct the camp on Guarn.-^

However, the following day,

24 April, FORSCOM received the first indication the Army would have to
establish refugee camps in the continental United States.

Early that

morning, Guam reached an overflow population of 50,000 and the Saigon
Embassy reported it had identified an additional 190,000 refugees it

1^

Memorandum of telephone conversation. Subject: Planning Guid¬
ance for Handling Vietnamese Refugees, April 23, 1975. Flights with
passengers with major medical problems, however, stopped in the
Philippines.
Ibid.
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wanted to evacuate.^

Now, with 240,000 refugees expected, Department

of the Army warned FORSCOM that the refugee situation in South Vietnam
dictated the necessity to make contingency plans "to receive, process,
billet and support evacuees at military facilities within the contin¬
ental United States.""^

However, the Pentagon again said it considered

such a move necessary only "in the event that safe havens outside CONUS
become saturated.""'"^

If such a saturation developed, the State Depart¬

ment would retain responsibility for the evacuee program, and would
exercise operational control through the Interagency Task Force which
President Ford established on 18 April, Department of the Army told
FORSCOM.18
Faced with this developing situation, Army planners at the
Pentagon the same day finally started analyzing the capabilities of the
inactive installations—Roberts, Chaffee and Pickett—which FORSCOM had
earmarked earlier as possible refugee camps.

FORSCOM waited through the

day for the message from the Pentagon which would order the establish¬
ment of the first camp at Roberts to handle 20,000 to 50,000 refugees.
The message, however, did not arrive.
Also, in anticipation of a massive evacuation of 240,000 refugees
from Saigon, the Department of Defense told the J4, the logistical

■'-^Message. Department of the Army to FORSCOM. Subject: Con¬
tingency Planning for Possible Army Support of RVN Refugees in CONUS,
April 24, 1975.
16Ibid.
1/
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planning section of the Joint Chiefs, to make plans to move refugees to
processing centers in the continental United States.

In addition, the

Department ordered the commander of the Military Airlift Command in the
Pacific to prepare to transport refugees to ports of entry in the
continental United States, if requested by the State Department."'"^
Until now, planners in the office of the Joint Chiefs had based
their planning for refugees on the assumption that the State Department
would evacuate only a small number of refugees, and therefore, there
would be no requirement to open a camp within the United States.

How¬

ever, the increasing realization that the State Department planned to
evacuate more than a few thousand refugees and that the Army could not
operate facilities by itself for possibly 200,000 refugees forced the
Defense Department to tell the other services they too would operate
camps.
On 26 April, the Department of Defense notified the Navy, in¬
cluding the Marine Corps, and the Air Force that they would share
responsibilities with the Army.

Because of emerging political senti¬

ment against bringing refugees to the United States, the Defense Depart¬
ment apparently took the responsibility for selecting refugee camp
locations from the hands of FORSCOM and moved it to the Joint Chiefs
level.

With this change, the Joint Chiefs ordered the Army, Air Force

-^United States Air Force, Air Force System Command Armament
Development and Test Center, Eglin Air Force Base, Florida,
"Operation New Arrivals: Phase I--The Buildup, 27 April-3 May 1975,"
Vol. I, July 1975.
(Hereinafter cited as Air Force Historical Report.)
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and Navy/Marine Corps to each nominate two refugee centers capable of
handling up to 20,000 evacuees.^®

The Defense Department told the three

military services that the camps they nominated should have the capability
of receiving the first refugees either on 28 or 29 April.
With the two other military services now included in the operation,
FORSCOM told the Department of the Army that it still considered Camp
Roberts and Fort Chaffee its first and second choices for refugee camps.
Department of the Army then forwarded the FORSCOM selections to the
Joint Chiefs and made it clear that they had to quickly decide on camp
locations because FORSCOM needed 48 hours to obtain clearances from
the State of California for the use of Roberts.^

FORSCOM also needed

the lead time to deploy Army personnel before the first refugees arrived.
Department of the Army, in an effort to hasten the camp selections, told
the Joint Chiefs it wanted "to address the matter immediately" and
recommended that they arrange a conference with the other military
services as soon as possible so camps could be selected.22
The Air Force, also alerted by the Joint Chiefs that it should
nominate two bases, set about selecting its sites.

The Tactical Air

Command Staff met at 4:00 p.m. on 27 April at the Pentagon and discussed
the possibility of using airfields at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, the
world's largest and most vital to the Air Force, and Holloman Air Force

^^Message. From Joint Chiefs of Staff to Chief of Staff, Army
and Air Force, Chief of Naval Operations, Commandant, Marine Corps.
Subject: Evacuation of Refugees, April 26, 1975.
^Message.
From Department of the Army to J4, Joint Chiefs of
Staff.
Subject: Evacuation of Refugees, April 27, 1975.
22
Ibid.
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Base at Alamogoreo, New Mexico, which could handle no more than 3,400
refugees.^3
The Air Force selected Eglin Auxiliary Field II, a 752-acre site
located five miles northeast of Niceville and sixteen miles northeast
of Fort Walton Beach, as its first choice.

It considered the site its

best possible camp because it provided an airfield, a road system, a
10,000-gallon water tower, an underground water and sewage system and
an electrical power source.
or more refugees, if needed.

In addition, the camp could support 20,000
0/

On 30 April, the day after the last evacuation flight left
Saigon, the Air Force Chief of Staff still had not informed the Eglin
commander that his base would be used as a refugee camp.

Feeling some¬

what in the dark. Lieutenant General John G. Hudson, Vice Commander of
Air Force Systems Command at Eglin, sent a message to the Pentagon and
asked for an immediate determination on how many refugees to plan for
and when they would arrive.

Hudson complained:

The number is critical in that we would choose a location
other than Eglin 2 if the number were substantially
reduced from our current planning figure of 20,000.
Use of Eglin 2 will disrupt the base intrusion surveillance
system testing now going on there and cause an impact up
to half a million dollars in additional cost and a
scheduled slip of about six months.25

Later in the day. General David C. Jones, Chief of Staff of the Air
Force, responded to Hudson's message and issued a directive to the

^^Air Force Historical Report, p. 1.
Ibid.
25
Ibid.
24
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Eglin command telling him to establish the center.

He told Hudson the

first refugees could arrive at Eglin as early as 3 May and that he did
not believe the refugee level would exceed 2,500 at any one time.
camp should reach full capacity by 5 May, Jones said.

The

Likewise, the

Marine Corps received similar instructions from its commandant to use
Camp Pendleton, California, as a refugee center.26
With the decision made to use Camp Pendleton, compounded by
pressures from aroused California politicians who did not want two
camps in their state, the Joint Chiefs picked the Army's second choice—
Fort Chaffee, Arkansas.

In the end, the Army, the first to plan for

refugees, came out with the worst deal.

The Air Force and Marine Corps,

in order to insure their short-term participation in such a disruptive
non-military duty, appeared to have located their camps at two
strategically important bases.

At Camp Pendleton, the Marine Corps

created tent cities to house the refugees during the summer months,
knowing that such accommodations would prove entirely inadequate during
late fall and through the winter.
camp closure date.

This in turn assured a pre-winter

Likewise, the Air Force selected its largest and

most strategically important base as its refugee camp and provided the
refugees with the same temporary tent housing as at Pendleton.

As a

result, a refugee camp at the Eglin camp disrupted essential training
and forced the Pentagon to realize that a camp could not operate at

^ibid. Like the Army, Jones ordered the Eglin commander to
provide billeting, messing, medical treatment, transportation, security,
safety, morale and recreation services for refugees.
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such a critical installation on a long-term basis.
In contrast, the Army made available its best installations to
house refugees for an extended period.

Although it selected three

World War II vintage camps, the facilities were in excellent condition
and capable of properly supporting the incoming refugee population. ^

Reservists and Politics
Although most Army, Marine Corps and Air Force leaders considered
the refugee program disruptive and non-military, a small group of
politically active Army reservists felt differently.

For this group,

composed of about 7,000 reservists trained to deal with refugee problems,
the resettlement effort offered an opportunity to aid them in their
efforts to convince skeptical Army leaders of the viability of their
specialties.28

in addition, the refugee program provided them a chance

which they hoped to use to stop the Army from making further cutbacks
in the civil affairs program.
Faced with the need to cut expenses since demobilizing its
Vietnam wartime force, the Army decided to phase out its civil affairs
program.

27

In previous years it had closed the Civil Affairs School at

Both the Marine Corps and Air Force indeed were the first to
get out of the resettlement business. The Eglin camp closed in
August 1975 while the Pendleton camp closed two months later. The
Army expected its two camps to remain open indefinitely. However,
both had closed by January 1, 1976.
■^Civil affairs specialties included: civil defense; public
administration; education; finance; health, safety, welfare, legal;
supervision of indiginous manpower; property control; food and
agricultural management; economics and commerce; civilian supply;
public communications; transportation; public works and utilities;
arts, monuments and archives protection.
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Fort Gordon and reduced Active Army civil affairs personnel from more
than 1,000 to 119 individuals.

In addition, the Department cut its civil

affairs planning staff at the Pentagon from more than 10 to less than
five during the previous years.

Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger

also considered the civil affairs force top heavy and needless.
he directed the phase-out of the program in the Army Reserve.

In 1974
However,

strong political pressure by reservists upon politicians in the Congress
prevented this.

In the past, similar attempts by the Army to trim

excessive fat from the Reserve program met similar opposition from the
well-organized, politically conscious Civil Affairs Association.

In

addition, politicians, including Senator Strom Thurmond of South Carolina
and Representative Robert L. F. Sikes of Florida, both major generals in
the Army Reserve, proved sympathetic to civil affairs reservists and
supported them in their fight against the Pentagon.
Although the refugee program clearly required civil affairs
specialties. Active Army leaders were hesitant to bring politically
conscious civil affairs reservists on board to help manage the two Army
camps.

However, faced with persistent political pressure, and the Active

Army's desire to get out of the refugee program as soon as possible, the
Pentagon acquiesed and included Reserve civil affairs specialists in
the resettlement effort.

Political Pressure
In early April, as speculation from the State Department con¬
cerning the evacuation of 1.5 million refugees reached the Army, the
handful of civilian civil affairs planners at the Pentagon appeared more
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than willing to commit reservists to the refugee program.

This handful

of planners who depended upon civil affairs reservists and the one and
only Active Army civil affairs battalion for their livelihood believed
that if State Department estimates proved true, the Army would need to
request the President or the Congress to mobilize the Reserves to help
establish a series of refugee camps around the nation.^
The group of planners in General Sniffin's office in April
recognized that the Active Army could not adequately run several refugee
camps since such a task would drain the Army of its strength and damage
Army readiness.

Sniffin, himself, concluded that the Army could use

reservists with selected civil affairs specialties to augment the Active
Army's only civil affairs battalion which had the responsibility of
managing the refugee camp at Fort Chaffee.^O
However, Sniffin expressed reluctance about using the Army Reserve
in the program.

Part of the traditional hostility which had faced civil

affairs during the previous 30 years—the belief that civil affairs
reservists were too political and "civilianized"—probably influenced
Sniffin.

Nevertheless, although Sniffin believed it feasible to use

either individuals or units in support of the operation, he did not
recommend such a move.

Instead, he told the Secretary of the Army that,

"the lack of a need for full-strength units, and...for the present time...

^Auletta interview.
30lnformation Paper.
From Major General Charles R. Sniffin,
Director of Operations and Plans, through Chief of Staff, to Secretary
of the Army, April 28, 197 5.
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the lack of a requirement for selected individual reservists serves to
demonstrate no justification for Reserve CA units or individuals in
support of current refugee operations at Fort Chaffee.
In early May, when it became evident that the State Department
had not evacuated anything near 1.5 million refugees, Sniffin again
tried to prevent the use of civil affairs units and individuals in the
resettlement program.

However, the political possibilities of the

program had tantalized some Reserve civil affairs officers who readily
realized they could not let such an opportunity slip through their
hands.

As Active Army leaders attempted to drop the matter, this handful

of reservists pressured their political allies—mainly Thurmond, Sikes
and Senator John Stennis of Mississippi—to get reservists involved in
the refugee operation.
reservists.

Sikes reacted quickly to the requests from

Within two weeks after the first three refugee camps opened,

the Pentagon reported that politicians had started to "persistently
advocate" to Army planners that reservists should participate in
Operation New Arrivals, the code name for the refugee resettlement
program.J32
Congressman Sikes initially protested against establishment of a
camp at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, which was located in his con¬
gressional district, because he feared refugees would complicate the
Florida unemployment problem.

However, he changed his mind.

Like

Senator Hugh Scott, Sikes probably saw the economic boost the camp would
bring to the communities which surrounded the Eglin camp.

3-*-Ibid.
32Auletta interview.
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Apparently on orders from the Secretary of the Army to involve
civil affairs reservists in the program because of political pressure,
Sniffin's office by 14 May had developed a plan which it hoped would
satisfy the mounting political demands to use reservists.

The plan

called for the activation of 23 reservists who would volunteer for longterm tours of duty to form an ad^ hoc unit capable of replacing the
Active Army's civil affairs battalion which FORSCOM had deployed to
manage the refugee population at Chaffee.
This token civil affairs force failed to satisfy Sikes who con¬
tinued to pressure the Army for involvement of at least 100 reservists
at each of the three refugee camps.

The Army, despite this useless

organization which it had developed for political reasons, made several
attempts to explain to the Congressman that the Chaffee camp needed only
a handful of reservists.However, the Army's explanations did not
satisfy Sikes.

On 16 May, General Sniffin replied to an inquiry from

General Weyand's office from Sikes concerning the possibility of de¬
ploying a 121-man Reserve civil affairs unit from Pensacola, Florida,
to the Eglin camp for a two-week period.^

Sniffin explained the Army's

plans to use only specialized reservists, rather than entire Reserve
units at Fort Chaffee.

He also said the Army had not identified a need

for civil affairs reservists at the Air Force camp.

OO

The explanation

It was somewhat of a white elephant organization because it
included some useless specialties such as information officer, attorney,
public welfare officer, four education personnel. These specialties
were not necessary because other Federal agencies provided personnel
with these specialties.
^Pensacola fell within Sikes' congressional district.

42
again did not satisfy Sikes who continued pressing for involvement of at
least 100 civil affairs reservists at each of the camps.
Three days later, Major General Frank A. Camm, Acting Deputy Chief
of Staff of Operations and Plans at Department of the Army, told FORSCOM
it appeared Fort Chaffee could use 40 civil affairs reservists.

The Army

apparently made this move in hopes of stopping the political pressure
exerted by Sikes.

Camm also believed that the Army could further

pacify Sikes if it could convince both the Marine Corps and Air Force
to use 20 reservists at their two camps.35
Meanwhile, Brigadier General James W. Cannon, commander of the
newly formed task force operating the refugee camp at Chaffee, indicated
he wanted nothing to do with plans to bring civil affairs reservists to
his camp.

General Todd, attempting to soothe Cannon, told him that he

fully understood his fears that units could not adequately handle the
camp operation.

Nonetheless, he told Cannon, "there is a great deal of

pressure brought to bear on the Army staff" to get reservists involved.
Despite Cannon's mild protest, FORSCOM decided to bring the reservists
to active duty.36
As a result of this decision, FORSCOM on 20 May asked civil affairs
units across the nation to find enlisted and officer personnel who would
volunteer for duty with the refugees.3''

Response to the query indicated

^Message.
From Camm to Major General Jeffrey C. Smith, FORSCOM
Chief of Staff, May 19, 1975.
-^Message.
From Todd to Cannon, May 15, 1975.
-^Message. From FORSCOM to commanders, First, Fifth and Sixth
Armies. Subject: Utilization of CA-USAR Personnel in Support of
Operation New Arrivals, May 20, 1975.
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that more than 100 volunteers were willing to enter on active duty for
one, two or three months to provide civil affairs specialties.
Meanwhile, Sikes' office told the Chief of the Army Reserve that
the congressman still wanted at least 100 reservists, rather than 27,
used at the three refugee camps and the scheduled new camp at Indiantown
Gap.

The Army concluded that it could accommodate Sikes if it increased

the requirement at Chaffee and Indiantown Gap to 30 reservists each, and,
hopefully, send 40 reservists to the other two camps.
The Army then contacted both the Marine Corps and Air Force and
asked if they could use 20 Reserve civil affairs personnel at both Camp
Pendleton and Eglin Air Force Base.
Marine Corps accepted the offer.

But neither the Air Force nor the

On 20 May, the Air Force explained to

the Army that because of the limited size and duration of the Eglin
operation, the base commander did not feel he needed Army civil affairs
assistance.Likewise, on 29 May, the Marine Corps rejected the Army's
offer.

The Marine Corps explained that it did not need Army civil

affairs personnel because the Pendleton camp already had Marine reservists
with civil affairs expertise helping run the camp.39
When both the Marine Corps and Air Force refused the offer, the
Army decided it could not justify activating 100 or more reservists for
use at its two camps and stood firm against additional pressure from Sikes.
However, the Army did bring on active duty two increments consisting of

38

Memorandum for the record. By Sniffin. Subject: Proposed Use
of USAR civil affairs individuals in refugee camps, May 29, 1975.
39
Ibid.
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31 reservists to supervise the housing, inprocessing, and feeding of
refugees at Chaffee and Indiantown Gap.

Officially, the Army made the

decision to ease the burden placed upon the Army's only civil affairs
battaion. 40

Unofficially, however, it appears the Army made the decision

to ease the pressures from a persistent congressman and politically
conscious reservists.

Planners also claimed the plans to use reservists were "coincident
with limited but persistent expression of congressional interest." In¬
formation Paper. Special Operations Division, Operations and Plans,
Department of the Army.
Subject: Operation New Arrivals, June 4, 1975.

CHAPTER III
AMERICAN OPINION

The people of Arkansas might as well realize what they
are sacrificing, bringing these people over to this
fertile country. The day will come when there will
be booby traps in the Ozarks and sampans on the
Arkansas River.—David Dahlem, Fort Smith, Arkansas,
resident.1

With plans made to open three refugee camps in the continental
United States, the belated evacuation of American and Vietnamese refugees
from South Vietnam entered its final stages.

In the eight days prior to

the collapse of Saigon United States planes evacuated nearly 40,000
Americans and South Vietnamese from Tan Son Nhut airbase near Saigon.
But, during the last week the airlift became increasingly dangerous as
artillery and rockets fell on the airport.

During one day of this last

week, Communist artillery hit an American evacuation plan, setting it
afire on the runway at the airport.

A short time later, Communist

artillery killed two American Marines who were guarding the United States
Defense Attache's compound at the airport. ^
On 28 April, Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft, Ford's Deputy
Assistant for National Security Affairs, interrupted the President during
a meeting on energy policy and told him that Option Four—a helicopter
airlift—appeared to be the only way to complete the evacuation from Saigon.-^
Ford waited several hours before making the decision.

Finally, Major

-^Southwest Times Record, letter to the editor. Fort Smith,
Arkansas, May 4, 197 5.
^Time, May 12, 1975.
^Newsweek, May 12, 1975.
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General Homer Smith, the United States defense Attache in Saigon, reported
that evacuation planes could no longer use the airport.
Ford the situation was out of control.^

Smith then told

Fifteen minutes later United

States Ambassador Graham Martin telephoned the President and told him
Option Four was the only way out of South Vietnam.

At 10:51 p.m. on

28 April, the President gave the order which signalled the beginning of
Operation "Frequent Wind," the most dangerous of the four evacuation
plans.
At 1:08 a.m. the next morning, Kissinger telephoned Ford to
report that the Navy had launched a wave of 81 Marine helicopters from
ships of the Seventh Fleet off the Vietnam coast to Saigon to start
the hasty pullout.

Meanwhile, in Saigon embassy officials established

landing zones at Tan Son Nhut airport and on a tennis court near the
Defense Attache Office.

Landing two at a time, the helicopters unloaded

Marines—about 860 in all—to reinforce 125 Marines already on the
scene to pick up an expected 4,500 refugees and evacuees.^
By nightfall the Navy had completed its evacuation from Tan Son
Nhut.

However, refugees designated for evacuation at the American

Embassy still awaited pick up.

As the Navy undertook this task, rain

blanketed the city, reducing visability to about a mile.

Helicopter

pilots relied on flashlights and flares fired by Marines within the
embassy compound to locate landing zones and evacuate stranded Americans

^Ibid. Options One, Two and Three all included the use of
transport aircraft to evacuate Americans and Vietnamese.
^Time, May 12, 1975.
6
Ibid.

47

and Vietnamese.

Through Tuesday night, thousands of Vietnamese who feared

they would be killed by Communist victors tried to scale their way over
the ten-foot barbed wire covered wall which encased the embassy compound.
To hold back the crowd. Marines used tear gas and rifle butts.''
At 5:00 p.m. Washington time—5:00 a.m. in Saigon—Kissinger
telephoned the President and told him that Ambassador Martin was then
closing down the embassy and destroying its communications equipment.
Twenty-two minutes later the Marine Corps completed the evacuation.

By

7:50 a.m. Marines had evacuated 1,373 Americans and 5,680 South Vietnamese
from Saigon—more than the Pentagon had originally intended to remove at
the last minute.

Q

Although the embassy officially had completed the final evacuation,
tens of thousands of Vietnamese continued to head out to sea to escape
Communist forces.

For two days American ships lingered off the coast

of Vietnam, plucking men, women and children from rafts, sampans and
fishing boats.

At night the mass of candles and lanterns burning on

the water looked like a densely populated city from the air, one newsman
reported.^
Officially, Washington did not know exactly how many Vietnamese
had left South Vietnam.
neared 50,000.

Officials at first guessed that the total

During the next few days the figure changed almost hourly

^Florida Times-Union, April 30, 1975.
^Jacksonville Journal, April 30, 1975. The week before, however,
about 40,000 Vietnamese had been evacuated by airplane. The total
evacuated by the United States reached about 80,000.
9
0p cit, Newsweek.

48
and by 5 May the State Department claimed that as many as 127,000 Vietnamese
might need sanctuary in the United States.
Congress sharply criticized the last-minute evacuation and Senator
Edward M. Kennedy, Chairman of the Senate Refugee Subcommittee, accused
government officials of "catastrophic bungling.Ambassador Martin,
a

bitter-end supporter, reacted to the charges by blaming the federal

government for the fall of South Vietnam.
following the evacuation

In his first news conference

aboard the USS Blue Ridge, he told reporters,

"There was no reason to have had to leave Vietnam this way—if we had
done as a nation, I think, the things we had said we would do and were
basically doing for the first year after the Paris agreements.""'"^
He also said there were two sides to the whole story:

"The Washington

side and our side."-'-^
Meanwhile, as refugees headed toward staging areas in the Pacific,
the three military services frantically prepared the three bases which
the Defense Department had designated as resettlement centers.

At

Eglin and Pendleton, the first camps scheduled to open, Marines and Air
Force personnel erected hundreds of tents and worked around the clock
setting up mess halls and other facilities for the expected refugees.
At Chaffee, primarily a summer training camp for reservists, soldiers
prepared old World War II wooden barracks.

To staff the camps, officials

from the Immigration and Naturalization Service, Health, Education and
Welfare, and State Department arrived and prepared to screen and process

-^Honolulu Advertiser, May 1, 1975, p. 1.
12
libicL
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refugees.

Workers from voluntary agencies also arrived to find refugees

homes in American communities.

Opening the Camps
When the White House announced the opening of the three camps,
politicians and residents in California, Florida and Arkansas reacted
bitterly to the President's plan to bring refugees into their states.
In all three states Americans, fed largely by rumors, misinformation and
outright bigotry, protested against the refugees.

Thousands of citizens

in the three states called or wrote politicians in Washington.

In

California, Representative Thomas M. Rees said he had received some of
the dumbest phone calls he had ever received.

He added, "They think of

the Vietnamese as nothing but diseased job seekers...If Americans had
thought that way in 1912, I wouldn't be here today.
my father came over from Wales.' ■1L'^3

That's the year

Representative Norman Y. Mineta also

of California said he had heard from some constituents who wanted to
be helpful, but added he had received "some vitriolic messages with
strong racial overtones."^
The State Department, in an effort to relieve the fears, told
Congressmen from the three states that only 50,000 "high-priority"
Vietnamese refugees would enter the three resettlement camps and that
the federal government would pay the total cost of the resettlement
program.

They also claimed that refugees would pose no health hazards

to local communities.

l^Honolulu Advertiser, April 30, 1975, p.2.
l^Ibid.
-'--'Associated Press dispatch from Washington, April 28, 1975.
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Meanwhile, rumors continued about the number of refugees which
the President planned to bring into the nation.

James A. Hayes, a

member of the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors, recalled that
on 21 April federal officials had told him of plans to evacuate from
600,000 to one million refugees from Saigon."'"^

Representative John B.

Moss of California, senior member of California's congressional delegation,
attempted to get a clarification of the situation and arranged a
meeting between the delegation and Ambassador Brown who was in charge
of the refugee task force.

Following the meeting, Moss told newsmen

the delegation did not find Brown's plans desirable.

However, Moss said

the ambassador did assure the congressmen that the government would
divide refugees evenly among the three reception centers and resettle
them evenly throughout the nation.-^

Brown also assured Representative

John Paul Hammerschmidt of Arkansas, whose district included the Chaffee
camp, that the only demands the refugees would make "would be on the
hearts of the people there who I think you will find will be swarming
out there to see what they can do."

1 ft

Protests against the refugees also came from Florida, not only
because of fear of disease and more unemployment, but because of in¬
adequate housing facilities at Eglin.

Senator Lawton N. Chiles, Jr.,

the junior Florida senator, said the federal government had not consulted
members of the Florida delegation about designating the air base a

-^Florida Times-Union, April 28, 1975, p. A-2.
1/lbid.
18
Ibid.
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refugee reception center.

He added:

It seems to me like they could have found another
base more adaptable to the program—an old base where
they have some housing...We feel like in Florida we
did our part for refugees. We've got 400,000 Cubans.
You might say there was some logic to our having
them because Miami is so close to Cuba, but my under¬
standing had been the Vietnamese would be resettled
in Southeast Asia.-^

He also said Floridians wondered how long the refugees would remain in
Florida.

Added Chiles, "Some of our Cuban people were supposed to re¬

settle, too, and they would carry them off, but they'd home (return)
right back to Miami."20
Officials, meanwhile, moved to stop fears that many Vietnamese
suffered from diseases which could infect the nation.

Dr. Theodore

Cooper, a physician designated by the President to be Assistant Secretary
for Health and head of Public Health Service, said that the refugees
posed no more of a problem to the health of Americans than the thousands
of other travelers who entered the country from the Far East every year.
He also reported that only a handful—80 or 90 out of a total of 34,000
received on Guam and five out of 3,500 at Wake Island—required hospitalization. 21
At a hearing before Senator Kennedy's subcommittee on 30 April,
Assistant Secretary of State Philip C. Habib reflected the federal
government's continuing uncertainty about the size and nature of the

^Honolulu Advertiser, May 1 , 1975.
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resettlement problem.

Habib admitted officials still did not know the

precise number of refugees and remained unsure of how many refugees
other countries would accept.

He also estimated the cost of the refugee

program during the first six months would include $55 million for the
evacuation by air and sea; $30 million for setting up and operating
staging areas in the Pacific and the United States; $75 million for
food, electricity, water and other needs of the refugees; $2 million
for clothing; $25 million to cover resettlement costs and perhaps $95
million in federal payments to state and local governments for extra
welfare and social services costs; and unspecified additional sums for
such purposes as resettling some refugees in other countries.

In all,

he said costs would range from $300 million to $350 million for the
first six months.

He also said that he would not quarrel with Senator

Kennedy's estimate that the cost for a one-year resettlement program
might be $500 million.^
The first refugees arrived on 2 May at 9:23 a.m. in 56 degree
temperature in Arkansas.

Prior to their arrival, camp leaders went out

of their way to assure Fort Smith civic leaders that refugees would not
create health or economic problems for the local civilian community.
Donald McDonald, the chief State Department official at the camp, told
the leaders they had no reason to fear the refugees.

He also said that

80 per cent of the refugees had a fair knowledge of the English language;
that 60 per cent were women, 25 per cent were children; and that most had
middle, upper middle class and professional backgrounds.^-^

^Ibid. Kennedy made the estimate in his report on the refugees
which was released June 9, 1975, also.
23southwest Times Record, May 2, 1975.
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The Ford administration on 3 May acknowledged that the number of
fleeing South Vietnamese refugees had risen to about 120,000.

The same

day the President authorized entry for the 30,000 additional refugees
heading for the Philippines by boat.24
sentiment again flared.

As a result, the anti-refugee

Public officials whined about the cost as they

received letters of protest.

A Gallup Poll conducted in the first week

of May reported that a majority of Americans, 54 per cent as compared to
36 per cent, did not want the refugees to enter the nation.
In Hawaii, Patricia Stillman, reflecting the anti-refugee
sentiment, wrote to the Honolulu Advertiser:

Are the tens of thousands of refugees entering this
country the same people who bought their way out of
the Vietnam military, ran the black market there,
trafficked in drugs, and are now prepared to buy
their way into the United States? They can't all
be wives and children of American servicemen or
United States overseas citizens.
If they have resources,
why was that not used in their war against Communism?...
Why should it be more difficult for a U.S. draft dodger
to reenter this country than any number of Vietnamese
who avoided their draft?^

Back in Barling, Arkansas, near the Chaffee camp, Mrs. Johnnie Calhoun
told newsmen she and her neighbors would be out with protest signs to
meet refugees at Fort Smith.

She added, "They say it's a lot colder

here than it is in Vietnam...with a little luck, maybe they'll take
pneumonia and die."^7

Also in Niceville, Florida, near the Eglin camp.

•^Honolulu Advertiser, May 3, 1975.
Z^Time, May 12, 1975.
^Honolulu Advertiser, Letter to the editor. May 3, 1975, p. 8.
^!Jacksonville Journal, May 2, 1975, p. 1.
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restaurant cook Bob Whitfield, commenting about the recession and the
state's 6.1 per cent unemployment rate, said, "Everybody is thinking,
why are they coming here?"28
Politicians in Hawaii feared that the federal government would
open a camp there to house refugees because of the warm climate and
because of the Oriental culture.

Governor George Ariyoshi, the first

Oriental to hold such a state office, although not mentioning racism,
said he was more concerned with unemployment and health problems than
humanitarian need.
By 4 May mail and telephone calls to congressmen were still
running heavily against allowing South Vietnamese refugees into the
United States.

Representative Bill Alexander of Arkansas received 10

letters in one day which an aide described as "most emotional."^®

Senator

Thomas Eagleton of Missouri received 100 letters with about 95 of them
against admission.

Senator James Buckley of New York received 200 letters

with two-thirds against admission.

Of the total, an aide to Buckley

said, 10 per cent were hard core racists and another 25 per cent were
biased against Asiatics.31
Representative Robert L. F. Sikes of Florida also received a
large number of telegrams, all against admitting refugees.

And Senator

Richard Schweiker of Pennsylvania said he received nearly 2,000 letters
and that the vast majority of them were critical, the primary reason
being jobs.

OO

^Jacksonville Journal, May 1, 1975, p. 1.
^Honolulu Advertiser^ May 3, 1975, p. 1.
30
Ibid.
-^Tulsa Daily World, May 4, 1975.

55

Letters to the Southwest Times Record, a daily newspaper near the
Chaffee camp, reflected the anti-refugee sentiment.

Phillip Brown, a

Fort Smith resident, wrote to the editor, "If President Ford is so set
in his ways that he feels we need to bring all these refugees into our
country, let him send them all to his home city and state of Michigan
and let his own take proper care of them all."

David Dahlem, also

of Fort Smith, wrote to the editor, "The people of Arkansas might as
well realize what they are sacrificing, bringing these people over to
this fertile country.

The day will come when there will be booby traps

in the Ozarks and sampans on the Arkansas River.
California officials, including Governor Edmund G. Brown, Jr.
and both United States Senators voiced alarm at the planned influx of
refugees into their state which had a 7.3 per cent unemployment rate.
Brown told newsmen that "California's first obligation is to its own
citizens."

OC

Mario Obledo, California's Secretary of Health and Welfare,

cabled Secretary of State Kissinger and warned that the state could not
afford to absorb large numbers of homeless refugees since it already
had "952,000 unemployed; 2.4 million receiving some form of medical or
welfare aid; 4 million near the poverty level; and 20 million paying
taxes as close to the maximum tax as is acceptable in free enterprise."36
Such worries did not remain unique to California.

Chicago's

Mayor Richard Daley commented that "Charity begins at home."37

^^gputhwest Times Record, May 4, 1975, p. 4.
34lbid.
35Jacksonville Journal, April 24, 1975, p. 1.
36ibid.
37lbid.
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However, Guam's Governor Ricardo Boradallo endorsed a resolution passed
by the island's legislature which offered homes to 25,000 refugees.-^®
Sociologists seemed confused about the anti-refugee sentiment.
Americans in the past generally had welcomed refugees.

David Riesman,

a Harvard sociologist, told the Washington Post that Americans were
full of self-pity.

He added:

We are justifying our grievances by striking out at
others. The national mood is poisonous and dangerous.,
and this is one symptom, striking out at helpless
refugees whose number is infinitesimal...this is the
same country, after all, which absorbed 400,000 dis¬
placed persons from Eastern Europe after World War II.
It took in another 200,000 East Germans who were
fleeing from a Communist government in the early 1950s.
It celebrated, almost euphorically, the arrival of
40,000 Hungarians—'Freedom Fighters,' the last in the
anti-Soviet uprisings of 1956.
In addition, during
the last 15 years, America absorbed at great expense
more than 675,000 refugees from Castro's Cuba.

Some sociologists speculated that the reason for the antirefugee sentiment was latent racism aimed at Orientals which the sorry
climax in South Vietnam brought to the surface.

Others, however,

offered more complicated theories about public frustration.

Anitai

Etzioni, director of Columbia University's Center for Policy Research,
told the Post:

Obviously, people are different with nonwhite races.
It's widely suggested that we would not have dropped
the atomic bomb on a white country. People in
California have often talked about being overrun by
the 'yellow hordes.' The color line has often
affected how Americans feel about things.^0

^Ibid.
■^Honolulu Advertiser, May 3, 1975, p. 3.
40
Ibid.
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Nathan Glazer, co-author of the book Beyond the Melting Pot,
believed a change in the way Americans saw America
caused the anti-refugee sentiment.

1

s role in the world

He added:

With the Hungarians and the Cubans, it was 'fight¬
ing Communism' and people supported that in the 1950s
and the early 1960s. Now they've given up on that
view...I don't think we feel on the same side
politically as the South Vietnamese. The press has
been so hostile to them—they've been described as
corrupt, so unable to defend themselves.

The press, sensing that Americans were acting out of character,
quickly reacted to the anti-refugee sentiment.

The New York Times told

its readers in an editorial on 3 May that America's better instincts were
on trial.

The paper said it saw no way to shed the responsibility, pro¬

claimed throughout the nation's history, for providing a haven to those
fleeing from persecution and conquest.

The Times also said it was easy

to be cynical about the agility with which some of Saigon's political
and economic elites used to get themselves and their wealth out of South
Vietnam, but added:

To focus on a handful of such individuals is to
distort the wider reality. The bulk of the immigrants
have arrived here penniless, fleeing for their lives
in search of freedom. Hard-pressed immigration
authorities are nowhere near providing a breakdown of
occupations; it is nevertheless evident that among
the refugees are many thousands of persons capable
of making a genuine contribution to American society
once they find themselves.

^New York Times, May 3, 1975, p. 18.
Ibid.

A2

58

The same day the Tulsa Daily World In Oklahoma also reacted to the antirefugee sentiment.

An editorial said:

In a nation that spends multi-millions of dollars
on dog and cat food, it sounds odd to hear someone
complain that 'we can't afford' to help out a few
thousand refugees from South Vietnam.

An editorial in the Honolulu Advertiser also chastised those Americans
who did not want the refugees to enter the nation.

An editorial on

3 May said:

The ironies are striking: many Americans were willing
to send their sons to die in the cause of defending
the Vietnamese from communism, now many Americans
seem unwilling to welcome those Vietnamese people who
have fled communism...One can debate all sorts of
things—the flaws in our past policy, the corruption
of some among the refugees, the legality of their
evacuation, etc. But anyone who doesn't feel this
nation has some continuing obligation for our past
role has missed a major lesson of Vietnam.^

Meanwhile, the Congress rejected the President's proposal for a
$327-million bill to provide funding for the resettlement program.
Opponents of the bill claimed that if Congress passed the bill, which
Ford proposed before the fall of Saigon, they would permit the President
to send American troops back to Vietnam.

Others expressed concern that

some of the aid destined for refugees that the United States had left
stranded in Vietnam would fall into the hands of the conquering Viet
Cong and North Vietnamese forces.

Ford reacted strongly to the

^Tulsa Daily World, May 3, 1975, p. 6.
^Honolulu Advertiser, May 3, 197 5 , p. 8.
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rejections and urged the House to quickly approve new legislation which
would provide assistance.

He also said "to do otherwise would be a

repudiation of the finest principles and traditions of America.

Ford

said, "The vote does not reflect the values we cherish as a nation of
immigrants.

It is not worthy of a people which has lived by the

philosophy symbolized in the Statue of Liberty.

It reflects fear and

misunderstanding rather than charity and compassion.
Ford told the press he was "damned mad" about the reaction of
Americans and Congress toward the refugees.

In the following days, the

President and his staff made painstaking efforts to convince the public
and the Congress that refugees would not add to the nation's woes.

At

the same time, Americans of a more humane stock rallied to be heard.
Letters to the editor in Arkansas newspapers clearly reflected the new
emerging sentiment of a segment of the nation's society which favored
the refugees.

A letter from Jennie Hopkins of Fort Smith said, "I

can't help but remember that this great country of ours was founded by
refugees from other countries who came here to escape persecution.'"^
Farris Rogers, also from Fort Smith, wrote, "These people being brought
here are coming because they cannot stay in their own land because of
their friendship with us.'"^

And Nan Bartlett of Fort Smith wrote,

"Our nation is preparing to celebrate 200 years of freedom.

And the

sounds being made by some Fort Smithians sound as though they have for¬
gotten why that first war was fought.

^Southwest Times Record, May 2, 1975, p. 1.
^^Southwest Times Record, May 6, 1975, p. 6.
^Ibid.
48
Ibid.
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Once the administration had convinced Americans that refugees
would not take their jobs and that the federal government would incur
all expenses for the resettlement program, apprehension melted away and
Americans began to warm to the plight of the refugees.^

^Politicians also sensed this change of sentiment and passed the
Indochina Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 197 5 which the
President signed into law on 24 May 1975. The act allocated $508 million
for the resettlement program, including $72.1 million for the daily
maintenance at Department of Defense reception centers and $84.4 million
for evacuation costs.

CHAPTER IV
REFUGEES IN PENNSYLVANIA

...the local climate is one of watchfulness and quiet
apprehension.—Brigadier General James W. Cannon,
Commander, Task Force New Arrivals.^

Senator Hugh Scott's "open heart" speech before the Senate on
28 April, in which he said he would welcome refugees settling in
Pennsylvania, made the Department of Defense realize it had a political
friend.

2

The fact that the Senator publicly offered refugees a state

welcome appeared somewhat unusual to the Pentagon.

In California,

Florida and Arkansas, where the Pentagon opened refugee camps, governors
and politicians voiced skepticism Jind hostility to the resettlement:
program mainly because they feared refugees would inflate state un¬
employment rolls and increase social problems.

In contrast, Scott, the

minority leader in the Senate, emerged as an ally of President Ford's
resettlement effort who willingly chastised politicians for their
unhumanitarian attitudes.

Confronted with this latent political

hostility toward the resettlement program, and the need to open a fourth
refugee camp, the Department of Defense remembered Scott's friendship
and offer.

Planning the New Camp
From the beginning, FORSCOM and Department of the Army considered
Camp Roberts, California, as the Army facility which could best

1 Message.
From Cannon to Brigadier General William R. Todd,
June 2, 1975.
2 Congressional Record, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. , S6882.
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support refugees.

However, the political decision by the Joint Chiefs

to use Camp Pendleton and not open Camp Roberts forced the Army to use
its second choice—Fort Chaffee, Arkansas.
Even after the Army opened its Arkansas camp, FORSCOM again
insisted that it considered Camp Roberts its first choice, if a need
for another camp developed.

Despite FORSCOM's strong feelings about

Roberts, General Sniffin's office on 13 May, two weeks after the opening
of Chaffee, asked FORSCOM to determine if Fort Indiantown Gap could
house 20-50,000 refugees for a long-term period.-^
FORSCOM became somewhat disturbed by this apparent political
move which seemed to ignore weeks of sound planning.

Nevertheless,

faced with objections, Department of the Army ordered FORSCOM to look
at Fort Indiantown Gap and determine if the camp could open within a 10
to 14-day period.

Department of the Army again, perhaps to soothe

FORSCOM, hinted that Army personnel would establish the camp, but hope¬
fully, a federal agency would take over camp operations.^

While making

its assessment, the Pentagon told FORSCOM to look specifically at the
old post hospital; facilities for language and skill training; schools
for children, either on or off post; airport facilities located within
a 50-mile radius; and the climate of the area.
Having received the request, Major General Gordon J. Duquemin,
in charge of operations and plans at FORSCOM, quickly informed the

-^Memorandum for the Record. Subject: Possible Use of Fort
Indiantown Gap to House RVN Refugees, May 13, 1975.
4
Ibid.
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FORSCOM Chief of Staff that "FORSCOM's answer is no."^

He said he con¬

sidered the hospital "so-so" and that the post lacked schools for
children, on and off post; that Harriburg, located 16 miles away, had
only a marginal airport; and that the climate appeared too cold for
Vietnamese.^
Meanwhile, the same day the Chief of the Army Reserve at the
Pentagon prepared a memorandum for General Sniffin's office concerning
the impact a new refugee camp would have on Army Reserve annual training.
Of the three camps under consideration, the Army Reserve believed opening
a camp at Roberts would affect summer training least because it would
have to move only 3,340 reservists to another camp during the 31 May to
2 August training period.
The Army Reserve considered Pickett, with 3,150 Reserve personnel
scheduled for training between the period 18 May and 30 August, the
second best choice for a new refugee camp.

In addition, it considered

Indiantown Gap, with its 7,797 reservists scheduled for the 4 May through
30 August training period, the worst choice for a new camp.^
At the same time, Sniffin's office asked the National Guard
Bureau to conduct a survey concerning the impact a new refugee camp
would have on Guard training.

The Bureau, however, reached opposite

conclusions to those of the Army Reserve.

Indiantown Gap had 7,545

National Guardsmen scheduled for training while Picket had 7,588 and
Roberts had 7,233.

5

Brigadier General Joseph R. Jelinek, Deputy Director

Ibid.
^Ibid.
^Memorandum.
From Office of Chief of Army Reserve to Deputy
Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans. Subject: Operation New
Arrivals, May 13, 1975.
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of the Guard, said movement of Guard units to other sites definitely would
create problems and recommended Fort Indiantown Gap as the Guard's first
choice.

The Guard considered Pickett the second best choice followed by

Roberts.®
Planners also brought the Army's personnel office into the planning.
The office said it had no objections, from the manpower viewpoint, to
any of the three installations because selection of any post ultimately
would require the Army to provide personnel.

Citing the shortages of

Army cooks which the Chaffee camp had created, the office told Sniffin's
office it should consider the use of contracted civilians to ease some
manpower shortages.^
Although the Army worried about the impact on Reserve training,
it considered the public affairs impact more important in the selection
of its second camp site.

The Pentagon felt that of the three posts under

consideration it should select the post that appeared in the best physical
condition.

Adding that television coverage at Fort Chaffee showed a

well-maintained post, Sniffin's office said, "to show any other image
has the potential for public affairs problems."^

in short, the lower

the state of repair of the post, the greater the public affairs problem,
the Pentagon felt.^

^Memorandum. From National Guard Bureau to Colonel Chamberlain,
Directorate for Military Support. Subject: Impact on National Guard
Training, May 13, 1975.
Memorandum.
From Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for
Personnel to Directorate of Military Support.
Subject: Impact on the
Nomination of an Installation to be Utilized for the Establishment of a
Refugee Processing Relocation Center, May 13, 1975.
■'-^Memorandum.
Impact analysis made by Deputy Chief of Staff for
Operations and Plans, May 13, 1975(?).
Hlbid.
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From the community relations viewpoint, Department of the Army
concluded that California would pose the greatest problem because the
governor of the state already had one refugee center which he disliked.
To put a second refugee center in California for an extended period
"would add fuel to an already smoldering fire," the office said."^
The office also considered Virginia, the location of Camp Pickett,
a potential problem.

Senator William S. Scott, the junior senator from

the state, was the only senator who had voted "nay" on the Senate
resolution which welcomed the refugees, and the Army considered Senator
Harry F. Byrd's position on the refugees questionable.
situation in Pennsylvania looked different.

However, the

Sniffin's office said:

On the other hand, Pennsylvania's Senator Scott(R), Senate
Minority Leader, has suggested the possible use of
Indiantown Gap Military Reservation (IGMR) for refugee
reception.
This would indicate political cooperation
for use of IGMR.
IGMR is in a somewhat reomote section
of Pennsylvania and no significant public affairs
community relations impact is anticipated. Of the three
posts under consideration, IGMR is the most favorable
from the PA viewpoint, followed by Pickett and Roberts.-'-^

On 14 May, the day after Department of the Army ordered FORSCOM
to look at Indiantown Gap, Eric von Marbod, Deputy Assistant to the
Secretary of Defense, assumed Defense Department leadership in the
refugee Task Force.

The same day he visited Indiantown Gap with a

party of four, including a Vietnamese physician.

At von Marbod's request,

the post commander, Colonel Ervin Johnson, escorted the group on a tour

12
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of the post.

Following the visit, Johnson told FORSCOM that von Marbod

appeared pleased with what he saw and spoke in terms of housing 15,000
refugees at the camp.^
Apparently von Marbod had made the decision to use Indiantown Gap
before he arrived at the installation.

Johnson said von Marbod told him

he thought the Army would receive an order to establish the camp on or
about 19 May, which would allow about 10 days to build up the camp's
cadre.

Von Marbod also believed the Army could work out any difficulties

with Reserve training by rescheduling or relocating it.-'--'

He also

indicated that a small military cadre of about 200 would suffice for
support of the operation and told Johnson he hoped the State Department
could quickly take over the refugee camps and resettlement program.
It appeared to Johnson that von Marbod felt that the Defense
Department would select Indiantown Gap as the fourth camp.

Colonel

Johnson reported to General Todd at FORSCOM that von Marbod told him
that Senator Scott made an offer to house refugees at Indiantown Gap
to the President and the Secretary of Defense.

He also said that the

camp facilities, including barracks, mess halls, clubs, and the gymnasium
favorably impressed von Marbod and his group.

Johnson said von Marbod

believed the facilities at Indiantown Gap were better than those at
Chaffee.

Johnson also reported von Marbod believed the best way to

-^Message.
From Todd to Cannon.
Subject: Possible Establishment
of Refugee Camp at Fort Indiantown Gap, May 14, 1975. Johnson was an
Active Army officer.
1^Memorandum.
From Colonel Ervin Johnson to Deputy Chief of Staff
for Operations and Plans, FORSCOM, May 15, 1975.
"ibid.
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provide cadre, about 200, for the new camp would be to transfer them from
Fort Chaffee directly to Indiantown Gap.

The Adjutant General of

Pennsylvania, Major General Harry J. Meir, reacted furiously to von
Marbod's visit and said he would see General Walter T. Kerwin, Vice Chief
of Staff of the Army, "to get this stopped.""'"^ Johnson summarized about
von Marbod's visit:

In each area Dr. Hung (the Vietnamese physician) wanted
to know the location of the chapel and was highly impressed
with chapels visited.
In the worst areas we pointed out
the undesirability and in each instance the reactions were
the same, "completely satisfactory and much better than
tents." Although no commitment was made by Mr. von Marbod,
he implied that the facilities were much better than he
expected and that we could surely accommodate 15,000.
Although Lieutenant Colonel Wampler (deputy post commander)
and I continually pointed out certain cautions, there was
no doubt in our minds that he intended to use this
installation to house 15,000, although he did not say so
directly.18

Johnson also said he had indicated his apprehensions about the
ability of post personnel to adequately support refugees to von Marbod,
but von Marbod continually reiterated that he would try to get
experienced Army cadre from Chaffee to support Indiantown Gap.

When

Johnson explained the northern location of the camp, the cold winters
and that the camp had to heat as early as late September, von Marbod
said that "too far north was foolishness" and that the Army could heat
buildings.

He also said, because of the heavily populated northeastern

United States, the State Department could easily find sponsors for

■^Ibid. Meir was a political appointee of Gov. Shapp.
naturally reflected the response of his employer.
l8Ibid.
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refugees in that area.

Johnson added,

"He (von Marbod) also stated that

money was not a problem and that we could hire off the street without
regard to Civil Service registers...Conclusion:

We just bought 15,000

Vietnamese refugees and may receive a cadre of only 200.
The following day, 15 May, FORSCOM acquiesed to the political
decision and accepted the fact that the Pentagon planned to open
Indiantown Gap as the next camp.

Taking a more positive approach,

FORSCOM operations and plans analyzed the capabilities at the proposed
camp and concluded that it could accommodate at most 26,000 refugees,
and about 2,900 Army personnel who would run the camp.

In addition,

engineers could rennovate the installation's 883-bed hospital, FORSCOM
said. FORSCOM considered the climate, although not the best,
acceptable for Asians.

The annual temperature averaged 50 degrees,

and ranged frorn^a low of 27.6 in February to a high of 7 3.3 in July.
FORSCOM also considered the old World War II built facilities basically
in good condition, as compared with those at other inactive installations,
and believed it would take a minimum amount of time to prepare them for
refugees.
In addition, the Pentagon believed the close proximity of
Harrisburg would provide a source of civilian employees and family
housing for government and military personnel.

Indications from Senator

Scott that Governor Milton J. Shapp would willingly have refugees

19

Ibid.
^^Point Paper, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans,
FORSCOM, May 15, 1975.
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at the installation also meant he would willingly waive the 90-day notice
required to revoke the lease of the camp to that state, FORSCOM felt. ) 1

Opening the Camp
The same day FORSCOM, armed with the official news that Department
of the Army had selected the camp, started formulating an operations
plan to prepare the camp.

On 16 May, General Sniffin informed FORSCOM

that General Cannon and an advance party would depart Fort Chaffee for
Indiantown Gap not later than 20 May to establish a new camp to house
14-15,000 refugees.^"*"
Four days later, 20 May, Cannon and his advance party departed
Chaffee for Indiantown Gap.

By 22 May all military personnel

from the

Chaffee camp had arrived at Indiantown Gap and started forming a Task
Force to provide logistical support at the camp.

About 2,000 military

personnel—somewhat more than von Marbod anticipated—had arrived at
the camp to prepare it for the first refugees within a week.

The first

refugees arrived on 28 May and the camp population reached 15,000
within seven days.
Although the local residents around Indiantown Gap did not
react as negatively as those at Fort Chaffee did, they clearly did not
offer an "open heart" invitation to the Army or the refugees.

As the

^Message.
From Department of the Army (General Sniffin) to
FORSCOM.
Subject: Task Force New Arrivals (Fort Indiantown Gap, PA),
May 16, 1975.
General Cannon, Commander of III Corps Artillery at
Fort Sill, Oklahoma, was deployed by FORSCOM, along with the 46th
General Support Group at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, to Chaffee to
form a task force. The task force directed the logistical operations
at the camp, including feeding, housing, medical care and recreation.
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Army expected, local leaders worried about the camp's 15,000 refugees
affecting the state's unemployment situation.

Governor Shapp, unlike

Senator Scott, reflected these fears and appeared apprehensive about
bringing refugees into Pennsylvania, fearing political repercussions
from the state's unemployed.
General Cannon reported to FORSCOM on 2 June, a few days after the
camp opened, his impression of Shapp's reaction following the Governor's
six-hour visit.

Cannon reported:

He (Shapp) seemed particularly concerned about the
potential health hazards associated with such a large
group of Asians (15,000). His tour of the hospital
and concurrent discussions of health and disease
problems... did much to ameliorate his fears that
typhoid, leprosy and other exotic diseases would
pose a threat to the local population.22

Cannon said Shapp emphasized that the federal government had
unilaterally decided to open a refugee camp in Pennsylvania without his
counsel and that it (the government) would likely have some problems.
Cannon reported the Governor generally said to him:

We Pennsylvanians will tolerate this effort and, to a
degree, will support it. However, don't visit your
problems on us and conduct the affairs of the camp
with as little disruption of normal activities in the
local area as possible. Don't threaten our health,
don't tax our water system and don't pollute our
streams with sewage.

2^0p cit, Cannon Message.
Ibid.
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The same day, Shapp, Cannon and Richard E. Friedman, the Senior
Coordinator at the camp, met with local officials for a two
and one-half hour session.

Following opening remarks by Shapp, Friedman

spoke of the nature of the civilian effort involved in resettling the
refugees and evacuees.

Cannon also answered questions from the floor.

Local politicians generally asked about the size of the refugee
population and how long they would stay; the effect they would have on
local unemployment; the types of diseases they had; how much money they
had; opportunities for employment for local people; opportunities to
provide contract goods and services; and security restrictions on the
post.
Following the meeting. Cannon told FORSCOM that the local leaders
did not react spontaneously nor did they appear eager to help by
volunteering their time, effort, or talents.

Cannpn concluded:

I am not at all certain that we have the full support
of these local leaders. In the event decisions are
made to increase the size of the refugee population
here, these men will have to be carefully informed
at the earliest possible time. My assessment is
that they will not react to such news in a very
positive manner. Basically, the local climate is
one of watchfulness and quiet apprehension over the
situation. Because of this attitude among the
leadership, we could be in for some difficult days
ahead, particularly if FIG (Fort Indiantown Gap)
turns out to be a long-term operation or if a decision
is made to increase the number of refugees housed here.^

Despite the initial apprehension over the new refugee camp,
Pennsylvania politicians at the federal, state and local levels

24
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eventually profitted greatly from the resettlement program. Scott it
appears was one of the few politicians to foresee that he could use the
plight of the refugees—coupled with a large injection of federal funds
into the state's economy—to his political advantage.

Superficially,

Scott's "open heart" welcome appeared humanitarian in nature.

More

importantly, however, Scott may have decided he could use the refugees
and the Pennsylvania camp to help ensure his re-election in 1976.^^
Govenor Shapp, on the other hand it appears, at first did not
realize he could use the camp politically.

Nor did he realize the

exact scope of the $508-million appropriation for the program. Although
Shapp never publicly admitted it, the program brought more than $6
million directly into the state's economy and virtually eliminated the
unemployment problem in communities surrounding the camp which included
Harrisburg, the state capital.

It also brought scores of dignataries

to the camp and publicity which Shapp needed in his race for the
Democratic presidential nomination.
The decision to use Indiantown Gap instead of Roberts proved a
godsend for the Army.

Unlike the Marine Corps at Pendleton, the Army

experienced few public relations problems with Indiantown Gap.

Un¬

doubtedly, the Army would have faced the same problems the Marine Corps
experienced at Pendleton had it used Roberts.

Also, unlike California,

where 25 per cent of the refugees settled because of the warm climate,

^Scott, however, announced in December 1975 that he would not
seek re-election. Political enemies charged he received $10,000 a
year in illegal kickbacks from the Gulf Oil Corporation. This probably
was the reason he decided not to seek re-election.

Pennsylvania with its cool climate did not experience a noticeable
increase in its welfare rolls.
For the most part, the Army's apprehension and fear about Indiantown Gap did not turn into reality.

Whatever anti-refugee sentiment

initially existed quickly melted as the economic benefits became apparent
to local Pennsylvania communities.
The second Army facility, situated in Pennsylvania Dutch setting
in a valley at the foot of a small mountain, became an obscure, somewhat
idyllic camp.

It was free of the problems the Army feared most and at

the same time served as a political tool for Pennsylvania politicians.

CHAPTER V
PERSPECTIVE

Vietnam has indirectly chosen our 1976 Bicentennial
theme: Don't Tread on Me—19776; Don't Count on Me—
1976.—Ronald P. Winner, in a letter to the editor.
Time magazine.

The events associated with the fall of South Vietnam brought vast
changes in how the American public perceived the United States as a
humanitarian nation and the role that the nation should play in inter¬
national affairs.

In foreign affairs, the public emerged for a time as

an ex officio part of the foreign policy making apparatus.

For the first

time since the isolationist period of the 1920s and 1930s, the public
had loudly voiced its opinions about America's international role.

It

had compelled Washington politicians to take heed of the wishes of
millions who were thinking that isolationism—the traditional American
approach to foreign relations—again might be the best policy.
Faced by these strong anti-involvement feelings, the Congress
during the last months of the Indochina war found it politically
necessary to discontinue military aid to the Saigon regime.

Whether

it realized it. Congress, by reaction to the public's wishes, emerged as
an equal, if not a temporarily dominant partner with the Executive in
foreign policy making.

Although Congress did not totally usurp the

President's constitutional prerogatives in foreign affairs, it had
effectively limited his courses of action and options in Southeast Asia.

^Time, p. 4.
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Strong public disapproval of emergency military aid was something neither
the President nor Secretary of State appeared to have expected.

The

isolationist and anti-involvement sentiment toward Southeast Asia, how¬
ever ,

coincided with the President's long-range plans.

Therefore,

little harm to America's position as a world power resulted from the
fall of Indochina.
Consistent refusals by the Congress to grant emergency military
aid in 1975 nullified the Nixon Doctrine of 1970.

The Doctrine,

formulated to allow American troops to gracefully leave Vietnam, had
proclaimed that the United States would provide the means, exclusive
of American troops, to friendly nations so they could withstand
Communist forces.

Nixon's doctrine was pragmatic and in tune with

political and economic developments in Asia during the 1970s.

Specifically,

the doctrine allowed the United States to take the first steps toward
economic reconciliation with Communist China.
The events of spring 1975 marked an unexpected second step in
the gradual transformation of America's Asian policy.

During the aid

debate, and despite rhetoric criticizing Congress for nullifying the
Nixon Doctrine, it appears President Ford was not totally dissatisfied
with congressional moves.

During the previous 10 years, American in¬

volvement in Vietnam had hampered serious discussions between Washington
and Moscow on detente, strategic arms control, European security and
the Middle East.

In addition, American involvement in Vietnam also had

prevented the United States from devoting time to Soviet and Chinese
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overtures to increase trade and technical collaboration.^

With the fall

of Saigon, tensions began to slowly melt and President Ford started slowly
changing the course of American foreign policy.
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was not unhappy about these
changes.

He admitted that the United States in the 1960s probably had

made a mistake by making a test case for American policy in Vietnam.

3

He also said the United States could have come out in a far poorer position.^
The Secretary also gave a preview to what he called a "fascinating period"
of realignment in Southeast Asia.

He said Vietnam with its 42 million

people and a good army, might become the major force in Southeast Asia.
He said he also believed that Cambodia and Laos would eventually be
satellites of Hanoi and that China and the Soviet Union would most likely
compete for influence in the area.

He also predicted that Thailand,

Malaysia and Indonesia would attempt to align themselves with Hanoi and
that there might be a possibility that Hanoi might ask the United States
to re-enter the area and help stabilize the situation.

He also said

China appeared afraid that the United States might leave that part of
the world entirely and open it up to Soviet influence.^
Political scientists saw the retreat from Southeast Asia differently.
Many believed it was not only a blow to American idealism but part of a

2

Alastair Buchan, Foreign Affairs, "The Indochina War and World
Politics," July 1975.
(Hereinafter cited as Buchan, "Indochina War.")
3 Honolulu Advertiser, May 7, 1975.
4 Hugh Sidey, Time, "Diplomacy: Henry Makes the Best of it,"
May 12, 1975.
* Ibid.
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larger process of a change in foreign affairs.

Alastair Buchan, a pro¬

fessor of international relations at the University of Oxford, saw three
significant results of the withdrawal of American presence from the area.
These were:^
1. The United States was once again, as in the early 20th
century, a strong Pacific power, but not a dominant one.
2. A change in the structure of inter-allied relationships
emerged with the fall of South Vietnam. American allies
exercised, as a result of the withdrawal of American
influence, more responsibility and initiative than a
decade before.
3. A change in the economic and monetary relationships between
the United States and other powers also resulted. A
dwindling supply of raw materials, especially oil, for the
United States caused this new economic approach toward
foreign relations.
These three points signified one important thing, Buchan said—a change
in the structure of world politics.
Earl C. Ravenal, a professor at John Hopkins University, saw the
Vietnam issue differently.

He believed the consequences of America's

demonstrated failure to act--however justified and right the decision
may have been—were more important than the consequences of the loss of
Vietnam itself.

He went on to say that Americans had rationalized the

fall of Vietnam by creating excuses and avoiding the real reason—the
failure to live up to commitments.

He feared the success the American

public had in Vietnam by constraining the Executive might evoke similar
restraints, or obstructions, in similar future situations.

Inter¬

nationally, he feared that the collapse of South Vietnam not only

^Buchan, "Indochina War."
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destroyed the premises of the Nixon Doctrine, but provided an early clue
to the instability of the present balance of power system.

He said:

The dilution of American guarantees makes it both more
necessary and more feasible for allies to seek the
protection of the adversary, to accommodate the adversary,
to strike a posture of neutrality, to attempt equidistance
between the great powers, or even to pursue self-reliance,
perhaps to the point of acquiring a national nuclear force.7

The political scientists who made these predictions, however,
overlooked two important points.

First, they did not realize that the

Nixon Doctrine was designed merely to get the United States out of
Vietnam.

Second, they did not realize that with the fall of Saigon,

North Vietnam emerged as a potential replacement or quasi-agent for the
United States in Southeast Asia.

Although the United States was no

longer physically in the area, the presence of a strong, possibly united,
Vietnam could accomplish the goals which American foreign policy makers
had spent more than 10 years attempting—to create a powerful force
capable of keeping the Chinese from pushing southward.

With the emergence

of a powerful Vietnam, the United States could rely upon Hanoi's strong
army and traditional Vietnamese—Chinese antagonism to keep Communist
China from expanding its influence throughout Southeast Asia.

After the

fall of Saigon, Hanoi certainly had the war materials needed for such a
task.

With its victory on 29 April, the North Vietnamese inherited at

least $5 billion worth of American military equipment.^

Not only could

^Earl C. Ravenal, Foreign Affairs, "Consequences of the End Game
in Vietnam," July 1975, p. 659.
^Honolulu Advertiser, May 1, 1975.
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Hanoi wage guerrilla warfare, but it also had the capability to conduct
conventional warfare—something which American forces were never able
to do.
In a conventional war Vietnam could send 1,000 or more tanks—
five times more than Thailand and equally as many as Great Britain—
into battle.

In addition, the North Vietnamese could use more than

1,000 American artillery pieces; $1 billion in facilities at Americanbuilt bases like Cam Ranh Bay; $2 to $3 billion in combat weaponry
ranging from fighter bombers to rifles; $500 million in spare parts,
engines, fuels and lubricants.^
By December 1975, eight months after the collapse of Saigon,
the President's designs for Asia finally began to appear in public.
Following a visit to China, and speaking in Honolulu on 7 December, the
President proclaimed what he called a new Pacific Doctrine of "peace with
all and hostility toward none."

The President, speaking on the 34th

anniversary of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, called for a foreign
policy based upon military strength and friendly relations with Japan,
the People's Republic of China and possibly Hanoi.

He said:

Let us join with the new and old countries of the Pacific
in creating the greatest of civilizations on the shores
of the greatest of oceans.-'-®
The new alignment in foreign affairs and economic order conceived
in 1970 with the Nixon Doctrine was becoming an embryo.

9

lb id.
^Philadelphia Inquirer, December 8, 1975, p. 1.
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in hopes of building upon the foundation, listed six points in his Pacific
Doctrine.

The most important included:

American strength was basic to

any stable balance of power in the Pacific; the United States must
normalize relations with China; outstanding political conflicts must be
resolved; a structure of economic cooperation reflecting the aspirations
of all the people of Asia and Southeast Asia must be created.
The transition to a new Asian foreign policy was not totally with¬
out trauma for the American public.

What appeared as a loss of Indochina,

perhaps to some as a sellout to Communists, presented sticky political
problems for the President.

Publicly, both the President and the

Secretary of State had to maintain an anti-communism stance.

In addition,

they felt compelled to chastise Congress for usurping Executive pre¬
rogatives in foreign affairs.

In an interview shortly after the fall

of Saigon, Kissinger said he doubted Hanoi would have staged it successful
military drive on Saigon had Watergate not sapped presidential power
and had Congress not enacted the War Powers Act.

He said:

In January '73 we did not foresee that Watergate would
sap the Executive authority of the United States to
such a degree that flexibility of Executive action
inherently would be circumscribed."'"^

He also said that he had not foreseen that Congress would pass a law
prohibiting the President from enforcing the Paris Agreement of 1973.
He added, "And while the United States may not have done anything anyway.

•^Ibid.
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it made a lot of difference for Hanoi whether it thinks the United States
probably will not or whether it thinks that we certainly cannot."-'-^

Per¬

sonally, the loss of Indochina to Kissinger may not have been as dis¬
tasteful as the usurpation by Congress of the President's power in the
field of foreign affairs.
President Ford, leader of the nation's morals and morale, also
had a difficult task.

The President realized he had the responsibility

for soothing Americans concerning the Vietnam disaster, and scolding
them for interfering in presidential affairs and persuading them not to
want to revert to isolationism.

In a speech at Tulane University on

23 April 1975 he told a group, "These events, tragic as they are, portend
neither the end of the world nor of American's leadership in the world.
Although the Vietnam War did not end as gracefully as the President
wanted, Ford believed that the nation came out of Vietnam with the "Best
solution possible under the most difficult circumstances."^

However,

the President warned Americans in an interview that in the case of South
Vietnam and Cambodia that if he had had the opportunity to have made
military assistance available, there might have been another ending to
the situation.
While the President faced the difficult task of assuring other
American allies that the United States would not abandon them, he also
had to turn American public opinion away from the isolationist path.

l^IbicL
l^Time, May 5, 1975, p. 20.
-'New York Times, July 25, 1975, p. 10.

In his efforts to do this, Ford rationalized the Vietnam experience by
claiming that the nation had learned several lessons that it could apply
to foreign affairs in the future.

He said that despite Vietnam the

nation still had to work with other governments that felt as the United
States did.

However, he added:

We cannot... fight their battles for them. Those countries
who believe in freedom as we do must carry the burden.
We can help them, not with U.S. military personnel, but
with arms and economic aid so that they can protect
their own national interests and protect the freedom of
their citizens.

This task proved more difficult than the President expected.

In June 197 5

a poll conducted by Time magazine showed that only one-third of Americans
believed it more important than ever to live up to American commitments
to send military equipment and aid, but not troops, to Israel in case
of aggression.^
difference.

A Harris poll released on 19 June showed only slight

Because of the American experience in Vietnam, a 43 to 27

per cent plurality of Americans favored using American troops, air power
and naval power to defend South Korea if Communist North Korea invaded
it.

18

The Domestic Side
Public opinion played no less of a role in domestic matters than
in foreign affairs.

Many of the constraints public opinion had placed

16philadelphia Inquirer, June 13, 1975, p. A-10.
17xime, June 16, 1975. However, only 19 per cent thought that a
lack of commitment by the American people was to blame for the fall of
Indochina.
ISwashington Post, June 19, 1975.
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upon the President in foreign affairs also were present in the refugee
resettlement program.

Anti-refugee public opinion proved a potential

political powder keg with which the President and his agents had to
contend.
Much of the anti-involvement attitude of the American public
emerged again when the President announced his plan to bring some
130,000 refugees into the United States.

As a result, politicians had

to weigh the public reaction as the President, State Department and
Defense Department started formulating plans to deal with refugees.
In evacuation planning public opinion had forced the President to
consider the impact, especially the political effect, that as many as
1.5 million refugees could have on the nation's depressed economy.

In

this regard, fears that refugees would take jobs away from Americans
and add to the^nation's social problems greatly limited the President's
options.

Because of these domestic considerations, it appears Washington

officials delayed planning for evacuation of refugees until the last
minute.

As a result, the number of refugees evacuated was about two-

thirds less than it should have been.
Public opinion greatly influenced other government departments
and political factions.

Anti-refugee reactions limited the Defense

Department in its plans to establish refugee camps throughout the nation
and forced it to establish camps in areas of the nation that looked
the most receptive.

Also, to state and federal politicians the refugees

and the resettlement program, for a time, looked like a touchy political
problem.

Those politicians who did not benefit from the program
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criticized it; those who did praised it.

Even a politically conscious

faction or reservists within the Army attempted to use the refugees to
their advantage.

The group, acting as agents for a larger group of

7,000 attempted to use the program to intimidate the Pentagon into
keeping what appeared as an obsolete Army program.
In short, the role public opinion played in the events associated
with Vietnam and the refugees was significant.

The American public,

if only for a short period, made it known that it had a say in both
domestic and foreign affairs.
the public opinion poll.

For the most part, its tool was simply
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